Deconstructing Deconstructivism: Part II

Looking at the process of deconstruction through the lens of deconstructivism is a bit like looking at the world through the eyes of Alice as she looks at the world through the looking glass; you can see shapes and colors, but nothing is clear. Derrida explained the process of deconstruction in a curious way when he stated that, “[it] acquires its value only from its inscription in a chain of possible substitutions, in what is too blithely called a context” (Derrida, 1985, p.2). Derrida presented deconstructivism as an organic act of creation found inside language, but he also presented it as that which was only determined by the context of its use. It is this one word, “only” that provides deconstructivism its protection, which is its ambiguity. Contexts are different and always changing. If deconstructivism is creation determined by the context with which it interacts inside language, then it is never the same and always evolving into something different. My point is that the process of deconstruction is an action of instability acting on that with which it interacts. This we do know. What we do not know is whether its interaction is an act of imposition or of revelation? 

I would like to suggest that the use of the term “organic” is an intentionally heavy term, and more calculated than not. Derrida claimed that he did not create deconstruction but found it as it was, always “going on around us,” which, interesting enough, was in the same state in which he claimed to have found language and meaning. They both, according to Derrida, were found … as unstable in their natural and true state, which begs the question: is instability their nature and true state? Were they found unstable before their interaction with deconstructivism or as the result of their interaction with deconstructivism? This is an important point because we know that there is instability in the world; what we do not know is whether this instability is organic, manufactured or a combination of both, especially when it comes to language?

Each morning, you and I awake to an unstable world. You can feel it just like I can. I am old enough to remember the stability of the world years ago. Sure, there were issues but there was decency and common sense; there is now tension and instability in their place. Both are now norms, replacing the stable ones of the past. It is disconcerting to me that stability is now perceived as a negative in relation to language and meaning. Words have meaning and will always have meaning. That should never change and yet, it has. In the next several paragraphs, I will present a case that deconstructivism, like its cousins, Marxism and Critical Theory, is intentionally providing the means to deconstruct stable norms and replace them with unstable ones for one reason: power.

Jackson and Mazzei, in their book, Thinking with Theory in Qualitative Research, describe their views of deconstructivism, which are directly linked to Derrida’s views. Jackson and Mazzei quoted Derrida when they wrote, “Deconstruction in a nutshell is the tension between memory, fidelity, the preservation of something that has been given to us, and, at the same time, heterogeneity, something absolutely new, and a break” (Derrida, 1997, p.6). The process of deconstruction is now an accepted part of qualitative research. It creates tension which allows it to be analytical, but it also needs this tension for itself. The process of deconstruction required tension to become an organic part of language, but to maintain this status it also needed man to be perceived as a threat to it because, like every other theory, there will be men and women who challenge it, as there should be.

Derrida thought—and I think he is right on this— that we (human beings) perceive tension as negative and seek to move away from it or eliminate it whenever we can, which would be detrimental to deconstructivism. Derrida understood that, as people, we tend to reject tension and seek stability, especially in our language. This would destroy the process of deconstruction. Derrida wanted tension … he needed tension, and he needed it to be embraced and accepted as a natural part of meaning and language, but he knew that would only happen if instability was language’s true and natural state. Jackson and Mazzei posited that deconstructivism’s presence will be where we find “unsettling,” or a “ruffling” of current normative structures (Jackson & Massei, 2012). This is part of the analytical nature of research, and part of the process of deconstruction, which began as theory, but has now extended into everyday life. Tension and instability, which are part of our world, are presented as evidence of the presence of the process of deconstruction, which I acknowledge, but what I struggle to acknowledge is that both are also presented as evidence of the true and natural state of language. 

What I believe instead is that the process of deconstruction is acting upon language, producing both tension and instability. It would be akin to me making the case that all trees exist in the natural state of being cut down, which I label as downcut. When they stand erect and grow, I label this as an imposed will upon them and not organic to them; instead, their natural and true state is downcut. My evidence in support of my theory is my ability to take my ax and chop down a tree. As the tree falls to the ground, I present it as evidence of the presence of downcut and as evidence of a tree’s natural and true state. Is that evidence of its natural state or of me (downcut) acting upon that tree with my ax? Is this unsettling or ruffling of a stable norm an indication of the presence of the process of deconstruction or is it simply change, adjustment or the imposed will of the process of deconstruction on that with which it is interacting? This is the confusing world of deconstructivism and why it is worth exploring. It is a roller coaster ride with plenty of ups and downs. There is much more to address. Please come back for the next post as I continue to try and deconstruct deconstructivism. Until then … 

Derrida, Jacques. (1988). “Derrida and difference.” (David Wood & Robert Bernaconi, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1982).