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Deconstructing Deconstructivism: Part III

by C. P. Lawrence

Deconstructing Deconstructivism: Part III

In this post, I jump back into the rabbit hole known as deconstructivism. Let me begin with this statement: the process of deconstruction is not the opposite of anything, but instead, it is a means of instability. This one statement will color everything else in this post. This much I know—deconstructivism is prevalent in our culture. It perceives any control or order outside of itself as detrimental, unnatural and as a threat to itself. It is built to attack all of this for the sake of its own preservation. A word of caution before reading this post … it is longer that usually and that is due to jumping into the world of philosophy. In that world, language’s importance cannot be understated. It is the primary tool through which philosophical thought is communicated, analyzed and debated. I do not plan to go down into the depths necessary to adequately explain language’s importance to philosophy, but I do plan to dig a little deeper than normal. So, let’s get started. 

When discussing deconstructivism or any other philosophical theory, the role of language must be addressed. Language is a communication system that involves words and systemic rules that organizes those words for the purpose of communication. We need language but so does philosophy and its theories. Language, as one of the main forms of communication, is important to philosophy, but before we get into why we need to understand the configuration of language. Language, as a form of communication, has specific components; two of the most important ones are a lexicon and a grammar. A lexicon refers to the words used by the given language. These words have meaning which must be understood to communicate. The grammar is a set of agreed-upon rules used by the lexicon to convey meaning. Without an agreed-upon lexicon and grammar, all communication would be ineffective. Therefore, language is used by philosophy as vehicle of change to deliver its theories and communicate them; deconstructivism, however, took this idea to another level, as we shall see. Over the next several paragraphs, I hope to accomplish two tasks. First, I hope to address how deconstructivism delivered this change, and second, I hope to address the change that was delivered. 

How does deconstructivism deliver change? You have probably already presumed that language was involved in some way, and you are correct. Deconstructivism, like all other theories, uses language as means of delivery, but deconstructivism does something no other theory has done … it goes beyond using it for communicative purposes and challenges its authority, or its grammar, by way of tension. It posited that the natural state of language was not fixed or absolute but unstable and fluid. This one fundamental belief does a lot of heavy lifting for deconstructivism. It provides a posture of change in both the lexicon and the grammar of language. Most philosophers assume a prejudice of general language to justify creating their own language. There are many reasons for this; some pure; some not. My point is that when they do this, they assume control of the language and the power associated with it. Deconstructivism is similar in approach but different in scope. It did create some of its own language, but it did this to control all of language. Language is its means of delivering change, but unlike other theories, the scope of change extends beyond its theory and to all of language and culture. It sought to position itself to be the lexicon and the grammar of all language for the purpose of culture coming under its control. How did it do this? 

It began with an attack on norms. Any past or pre-established norm was considered a threat to deconstructivism due to stability. Deconstructivism posited that stability is not a norm’s natural state but is, instead, a sign that a norm has moved away from its natural state of instability. The first battle began with language. Is there any bigger norm out there? If it could deconstruct language and re-create it in a way under its control, then, nothing was out of its reach. Culture, in many ways, is defined by its norms, and there is no other factor as impactful as language. We may quibble over whether it is a norm or not, but it does color the culture in which it lives. Norms along with language are two of the standards that define culture. If we understand this, we may better understand some of the political battles taking place and why the fight is so intense. What is at stake? The answer is our norms. They define our culture, and they define us. 

Norms are norms because they are behaviors or mindsets considered acceptable by most people of a specific culture despite their own individual beliefs. Norms that are stable define our culture and define who we are, but stable norms are under the constant attack of deconstructivism for one simple reason: stability threatens deconstructivism. Why? We only need to go back to the first paragraph and remember that deconstructivism is not the opposite of anything, but instead, it is a means of instability. Norms that are stable produce consistency, sameness and constancy. Stability is often seen as the opposite of change, and when it comes to human behavior, stability is seen as the neurological basis for consistent habits which involve the stabilization neural information. Stability makes change more difficult, and it makes control next to impossible. For deconstructivism to impact culture, it needed instability to be a norm and then it had to become “the” norm of all norms. How did it do that? It created cultural instability and then became the stability in the instability. Establishing instability as the natural state of language allowed language to be the vehicle of change. It was language that did the work of deconstructivism; it was language that delivered instability to culture. 

Deconstructivism still had to address those norms that were most dominant. Deconstructing any norm requires the general population of the culture in which it lives to embrace the change. Support for a change to something stable will only be accepted if there is initial suspicion of the norm. This suspicion flows out of the instability of the norm, which would have been established by deconstructivism. When a tried-and-true norm is perceived as unstable, our human condition takes over rendering us suspicious of it. We begin doubting it and the other norms associated with it. You have experienced it over the last several years … removing statues of past leaders, attacking the integrity of institutions put in place to protect and serve and even promoting bias and oppression as good. This is how deconstructivism delivers the change it needs to live. It has changed you and me, and it is fundamentally changing culture.   

What change has deconstructivism presented as normal? That one is easy; it is instability. Instability comes in many forms. It is tension and doubt. It is skepticism and isolation. What do these things do to us? Well, they weaken our foundations and punch holes into our existing norms, reducing everything to its lowest form, which makes us doubt everything.  When we do this everything is vulnerable to the dominant idea of the day, which would be, you guessed it, deconstructivism. Norms are not just commonly held beliefs; they are guard rails of the highway we call culture. Removing them does not bring freedom but danger. A culture without norms was what Derrida wanted because he wanted deconstructivism to be the guard rails of culture. He would call such a state the “absence of presence” or the “already-always present,” and he would embrace it because it would be a culture of instability. Derrida would refer to such a situation as “trace” and see it as a means of stripping away the “supposed” contradictions of language, opening it to new “true” meaning. He would call it “the absent presence of imprints on our words and their meanings before we speak about them” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. 19).

This is deconstructivism in its truest form. It is “the norm” that defines all other norms by pushing every other one to instability while it remains as the lone stable dominant norm. We see and experience it every day. It is present in our media and especially in our government. If you listen, you will hear it. Truth is no longer that which is true, but that which is repeated and situational. Any belief in anything stable is to be challenged because everything must be unstable. The media is no longer the watch dog of the people but the mechanism of manipulation and change. Anything presented as an absolute is attacked, viewed with suspicion and perceived in negative ways for one simple reason: it is a threat to instability. Then, there is suspicion—we have become suspicious of everything. This is the impact of deconstructivism.

Suspicion is only a short path to the cliff of paranoia. Those who are suspicious of everything eventually doubt everything, which is a form of paranoia. What do you trust in culture? What do you know to be true in culture? Are you concerned that there are no longer real answers to these questions? This is deconstructivism. It works by giving everyone access to itself through suspicion brought on by instability. Someone said to me, but we have community, don’t we? We are told that we have community, but what we really have is isolation. Our “community” is no longer in-person but one of technology. We text, tweet, post and email more than we talk in person; that is not community. That is living inside instability and calling it other things: individualism, preference, perception and self-preservation. Make no mistake, these are not elements of community but elements of instability and deconstructivism.

This world of deconstructivism is a strange world. It is a world where everyone is king. The problem is that when everyone is king, no one is king, except the one who made everyone king. We embrace and encourage selfishness. We no longer talk about integrity and honor. Difference is a means to an end, and we have eviscerated any idea of excellence by calling it intolerance. Everyone has become a judge without ever looking in a mirror. Integrity has been pushed aside and replaced by self-preservation and empathy for others has evaporated into the air. Hard work is viewed with suspicion and all forms of submission are labeled as oppression. We choose criticism over encouragement, negativity over positivity, selfishness over selflessness and materialism over minimalism. This is our world. How are we to respond to it? That is for another day and another post. Until then …  

  Derrida, Jacques. (1988). “Derrida and difference.” (David Wood & Robert Bernaconi, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1982).

Deconstructing Deconstructivism: Part I

by C. P. Lawrence

Deconstructing Deconstructivism.

Deconstructivism, another theory critically aimed at the norms of culture, is a theory that has impacted all of us and yet, most of us have never heard of it. To understand it is, at best, to attempt to understand it because, be warned, it is ambiguous and vague. It is like nailing Jello to the wall; once you think you understand it, it interacts with something else and changes. Deconstructivism is change and difference and criticism and tension all rolled up into what I see as varied disparity. It first appeared in a 1967 book entitled, On Grammatology, and has grown in reference and documentation ever since.

Let’s begin with a quote. Jacques Derrida, in his article, Letter to a Japanese Friend, explained deconstructivism to his friend by insisting that it is “an event that does not await the deliberation, consciousness or organization of a subject or even modernity” (Derrida, 1985, p.2). If this seems a rather odd way to describe an event, you are right, but it is not an event that he is describing; it is deconstructivism. Inside that seemingly innocuous description is affirmation to deconstructivism’s metaphysical reality. Derrida stated to his friend (Professor Izutsu) that to define it or even translate the word “deconstruction” would take away from it, which is a suggestion to its nature and to its protection. How does one disagree with that which cannot be defined or translated? The answer is simple: one does not because one cannot.

Derrida, in my opinion, was stating that deconstruction was a notion of a reality rooted in situational agency. It was designed to avoid the confined corner; to avoid the proverbial box or the closed door and to assert its own agency in interaction with individualism (or context) as a means of truth. According to Derrida, it was and is a critical methodology that analyzes how meaning is organically constructed and deconstructed within language, which we all understand to be the primary means of communication between human beings, and yet it is not language that seems to be under attack. Instead, language seems, to me, to be the vehicle of delivery for deconstructionism.

Let’s be clear; deconstructivism is not a form of Marxism nor of Critical Theory, but it is related to both, although indirectly. The process itself claims to reveal the instability of language, which it presents as language’s true and natural state. Is language unstable or is language, as my cynical mind suspects, being pushed to instability by deconstructionism? I would like to posit a question: if instability were not language’s true and natural state, could deconstructivism determine language’s state or would it, instead, change its state? I am not sure, but I look forward to exploring that possibility and others. I do know this; its existence depends on instability of language and meaning.  

Back to this question, is language unstable? Yes and no! I think language is like anything else; it works from instability to stability. I know I seek clarity in my communication and one of the ways I do that is to ensure that meaning is consistent with those with which I am communicating. How is language unstable? I believe language is unstable if meaning inside language is unstable. How does that instability remain and not work towards stability? One of the methods of maintaining instability is through addition. When other meanings are added to true meaning, clarity is not produced but instead, instability is maintained.  Addition, for me, creates instability, especially when it comes to language. If we have found instability as a state of language and this discovery was the direct result of deconstructivism’s interaction with language, then, there is another more difficult question to consider. Is the instability of language its true and natural state or is it a direct result of deconstructivism’s interaction with language? 

Deconstructivism claims that one of its goals is to push meaning to its “natural” limits and expose its “true” nature which, according to Derrida, is instability heavily dependent on difference (addition). I am not a big fan of coincidences and see them as problematic. Here is my issue. If language is considered unstable in its natural state and deconstruction is instability in its interaction with language, is this a coincidence? Again, I don’t really buy into coincidences. I do know that when instability interacts with stability the results will generally be less stability. We know this through the study of physical systems, biological systems and even social systems. We also know instability manifests in three ways: gradual change, sudden transitions and oscillations, and there is nothing to indicate that when instability is introduced to a stable system, that stable system stays the same or even stays stable. It always changes; at times, stability may eventually be achieved again but not before the system goes through a period of instability. My point is that I am not convinced that the natural state of language is instability. There is a solid case that the instability of language is due, in part, to its interaction with that which is unstable. Are you confused yet? Buckle up because this roller coaster ride is just beginning. This post is the start of a deep dive into the world of deconstructivism. Stay tuned for my next post in this series. Until then … 

Derrida, Jacques. (1988). “Derrida and difference.” (David Wood & Robert Bernaconi, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1982).

Zetetic Philosophy: The Pursuit of Understanding

by C. P. Lawrence

Zetetic Philosophy: The Pursuit of Understanding

I recently read an article about the pursuit of understanding related to Zetetic Philosophy. The term “zetetic” is not a term we often hear or even use, and yet it is an important one. The term is derived from the Greek word “zeteo,” which means “to search or to examine.” Zetetic Philosophy emphasizes the importance of questions and investigation over relying on preconceived notions, facts and assumptions. This sounds familiar but what many do not realize is that most philosophy today begins at a culturally- accepted position, which is preconceived. The article suggested that we should view Socrates as a Zetetic Philosopher due in part to his detailed explanation in the Republic of the ideal type of formal education. This intrigued me, but education is not the reason I read this article; understanding is. 

If you read the Republic (and I recommend that you do), you will encounter the philosopher-kings, Socrates ideal rulers. They are noble and intelligent known by their virtues who think through a certain praxis, thus the moniker philosopher-king. Socrates referred to their thinking process as the dialectic and presented it as a positive form of dialogue that incorporated “arguments in order to achieve a sure and true understanding of reality (Being).” The dialectic was a form Socrates used to test how and why things are the way they are. For Socrates, the dialectic was a method to achieve knowledge, of what he called the “Good-in-itself,” by distinguishing “the good” from everything else. Many see the dialectic as the Socratic Method. They are not one and the same but two different methods. 

The Socratic Method differed from the dialectic, in part, due to the “method of questioning,” which expressed more ignorance than understanding, which seems odd and counter intuitive. Both processed through the antithesis to confirm what is true, but only the Socratic Method embraced uncertainty as a healthy part of the process. In the Socratic Method, the teacher must hold knowledge—know something and give account of that something known—to impart knowledge or lead others in obtaining knowledge. The teacher must master both the knowledge and the method of distribution of the knowledge to move past the stage of personal ignorance to lead others to understanding. This is not a weakness of the Socratic Method but a strength. Read any of Plato’s dialogues, you will find that Socrates was this type of teacher. 

The author suggested that Socrates, as a teacher, had the following characteristics as a teacher: the desired results were met, he had the answers he sought from his students, his method unfolds in a “teleological” manner and his form of knowledge is different than the knowledge associated with the virtues he conceived. This is in stark contrast to Socrates numerous claims of ignorance, but this idea of ignorance is important or else he would not keep using it. In the Republic, Socrates denied several times that he was in possession of a certain kind of knowledge. He stated several times that he knew nothing. What is happening here? Is ignorance an important part of knowing? 

Several authors have pointed out that Socrates sought to be a co-participant in the learning process with his students, even abjuring the moniker of “teacher” as too formal to achieve equal status with his students. Was ignorance a means of this equal status? This is, in some sense, Socrates maintaining a posture of seeking and yearning for wisdom in the same manner as his students. The author implored us not to fall for Socrates trying to present himself as a radical nihilist skeptic but to look deeper, deeper into this idea of understanding as it relates to ignorance. Seeing Socrates as a zetetic philosopher is “antithetic to the philosophical ideal of the philosopher-kings of the Republic who were to lead their city-state towards that which is good and true,” or at least that was their goal?

These philosopher-kings are referred to as echonic philosophers (traditional), and Socrates never claims to be their equal. This idea of echonic philosophy, which these kings are thought to possess, is found in Book VII of the Republic and represents authenticity and proper education which was supposed to provide the possessor of both an ability to grasp what it takes to rule. Yet, the author references Socrates as a zetetic philosopher, which is a philosopher who embraces a a philosophy that is ongoing, dynamic and critical in analysis. It is one with no real answers and instead seeks to continue to inquire. Its understanding is not found in Plato’s forms but grounded in humanity and its limits and finitude. This is an important point regarding the pursuit of understanding. It is a never-ending process that is always fluid, ongoing and never ending. 

The author implies that we must learn from Socrates that real education is based on zetetic philosophy, as this is, according to Plato, a “turning around of the soul” back to itself in an enlightened state. This suggests something more about education and about understanding, especially if we look at the three moments referenced in the zetetic journey found in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. First, there is liberation from bonds, then there is ascent upward to the light and finally there is the return to the cave. These three moments come together to fully express enlightenment or education and understanding. This idea of zetetic philosophy was thought to be that which avoided expecting absolute, irrefutable instances of truth, as if they did not exist. 

The implication is that we must recognize our ignorance and our limitations as human beings first. This is where the pursuit of understanding begins. It does not begin within the knowledge itself, but within us, recognizing first our humanness and acknowledging second our limitations. Therefore, all pursuits of understanding, as hard as this may be to understand, seem to begin within us and not within the knowledge that we seek to understand. Is this the message of Socrates? Does this make sense? I am not sure, but it does force me to do one thing … think and that is always a good thing. Until next time …   

The Rise and Fall of Western Civilization: Part IV

by C. P. Lawrence

Part IV: Decline

My intention was for this to be the last post in this series, but the more I read the more I realized that there was more to say than could be contained in one final post. Therefore, there will be one more post after this one. Let’s get started! 

In the 21st century, we have seen many cultural changes. Tried and true traditional beliefs have been attacked, longstanding norms have been destroyed and many new ideologies have emerged. There are those who would suggest that these new ideologies are by-products of the West. Gregg would contend that these new “influential and secular ideologies” offered themselves initially as “emancipations to rationality and science,” which have always been perceived as pathways to reason. Karl Marx and his philosophy, Marxism, asserted itself as one of those pathways, but Marxism, ironically, does not value reason. Marx regarded the human mind as “extremely limited” when it came to knowing truth. His colleague and fellow Marxist, Friedrich Engels, shared this belief, believing that “ultimate truths” are rare in the natural sciences and that the final and ultimate moral truth was “the rarest of all.” Marx concluded that man’s ultimate origin and the nature of good and evil were futile pursuits not worth time or energy, forcing him to embrace a more Promethean view of man as a self-created existential being (Prometheus was a Greek god who modeled humans from clay and taught them agriculture and all the ways to live. He also stole fire and gave it to them, allowing them self-sufficiency.). Reason, or any higher ordered thinking, was not needed in a pragmatic Marxist world. What was needed, according to Marxists, was more Marxism.  

To provide Marxism to the masses, Marx and Engels created a secular more widely accepted Marxist ideology, intentionally designed with religious nuances to be presented as more a religious faith than a philosophy. Marx, Engels and other Marxists sought to replace traditional religious beliefs with Marxism, and they did it through the synthesis of faith and reason, a process already adversely impacted by the Enlightenment. It was their intent to replace faith with Marxism through the reason of the Enlightenment. Marxism was entwined with this reason to consume it and squeeze faith completely out of it, turning it into something Marxist-like. It was Marxism that was now synthesized with this new reason, which produced a Marxist worldview that could be packaged and delivered to the world. It was built to critique, not in constructive ways, but with destructive tendencies that weakened and destroyed, paving the way for it to rule. But it was built with a flaw. It assumed a particular understanding of the human condition as true and right. 

It was Nietzsche, initially, an advocate of the Enlightenment and of Marxism, who saw this flaw and the manifestations of it. He, ultimately, rejected the Enlightenment, the reason it produced and the Marxism it embraced, recognizing that while it was built to undermined Christianity and those traditional religious norms associated with it (Christianity was both a traditional belief and longstanding dominant ideology.), it would never stop there. Nietzsche understood that it would eventually undermine the entire culture and everything in it. The flaw was an assumption … That human nature was good, and that it only needed a better culture in which to live to thrive. It soon discovered that the human condition was just as corrupt inside a Marxist culture as it was outside of it.   

Nietzsche is an interesting case study when it comes to the West. In The Gay Science, he wrote, “it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the thousand-year-old faith which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth; that truth is divine.” I think Nietzsche understood that truth, God, Christianity, science—all of it came together as one in this culture known as the West. It was this culture that was unique and unlike any culture before it. It was a culture of the many functioning as one; it acted as one, moved as one and changed as one. Nietzsche understood the West, but he also understood that if they stood as one, they would fall as one, and that included everything. 

Marxism, to overcome the West, had to undermine the West and overtake the beliefs and ideologies that were so dominant for so long. It forgot that once it had overtaken the West it would, itself, become the dominant ideology, and go from the hunter to the hunted. This is precisely what Nietzsche was addressing in The Gay Science. When he wrote, “God is dead,” he wrote that “we” killed him. Not you or me; not he, but “we” killed him, implying that this collective whole of the West, this many acting as one, was in trouble. He understood that a rejection of any one thing in the West would ultimately be a rejection of everything, including those things that were good. This was the nature of the West.

Freeing individuals to pursue life, liberty and happiness sounds like freedom and functions like freedom for a time, but it does not take long before freedom become excess, and excess becomes selfishness and narcissism. In the West, we stopped pursuing morality in the name of freedom because, in our excess, we became confused regarding what freedom was. Freedom become something it was never intended to be. What happened? You will have to come back and read my last post to find out! Until then … 

The Rise and Fall of Western Civilization: Part III

by C. P. Lawrence

The Roman siege of Jerusalem in 70 C.E.

Part III: The Beginning of the End

Many consider the “West” a nebulous term with no meaning and no history and yet most consider it in decline. As I have referenced, when Oswald Spengler published his epic, The Decline of the West, he posited that the West “wasn’t just in decline; it was being dragged under.” His thesis was that all “cultures” go through a process of birth, blossoming, fruit production and withering to the point of death. The withering phase he called “civilization” because he associated it with a process within the withering phase of excess, debilitation, loss of identity and finally, death. Spengler first published his masterpiece in 1918, and at that time, he saw the West in the withering stage. As he pointed out, the beginning of the withering stage is excess. When civilizations reach the point of excess they become fat; that is not a point of celebration but one of warning. Spengler saw the West at this stage, which forces us to consider a question we would rather not: where is the West now? 

Let’s be clear: the West is not a country, nor does it have geographical boundaries, but it does have a birth, and because it has a birth, it will ultimately have a death. Its birth, according to Spengler, occurred with the fusion of German nobility and the Western Roman Empire, as Spengler saw his native Germany as part of the West. Others point to the marriage of Athens and Jerusalem, but all are references to the merging of the two known worlds at the time into something new and different. Spengler thought the West “blossomed” in the Italian Renaissance, bloomed in the Baroque period and produced its greatest fruit in the 19th century. Gregg posited that the Enlightenment was one example of its fruit, but fruit is only good for a time; eventually it rots.

The Enlightenment, most would say, was not united with Christianity but instead at odds with it. Gregg rejects that idea and any idea that the Enlightenment advanced individual reason at the expense of personal faith. He acknowledges the rise of and focus on reason, but he also points to examples of reason and faith coming together for good during the Enlightenment. He presents one important Enlightenment figure in support of his supposition: Sir Isaac Newton. It was thought that Newton wrote his Principia Mathematica in response to the “materialist assumptions” of Rene Descartes and his views on planetary movements. Newton believed that the entire cosmos, including planetary movement, were governed by a Holy God and his divine providence. It was his faith that drove him to study the world and understand it. Many Enlightenment thinkers considered religion as superstition, but others, like Newton, did not.

As far as products of the Enlightenment, the founding of America is often referenced as one of its greatest. While there is evidence to support this assertion, there is also evidence, i.e., its foundational documents, that tell another story; one where its founders grounded virtue and human morality in reason bathed in a belief of divine goodness. Those Enlightenment ideas that were at odds with the Christian faith coincide with the rise of reductionism and the scientific method as both were coming of age at this time. It was reductionism and modern science that attacked faith, presenting it as incompatible with reason, for the purpose of crowning reason as the only king.   

According to Gregg, there were two claims that severed the reason of Enlightenment with the Christian faith; the first was the belief that there was no fixed human nature, which clashed directly with the Christian belief of a sinful human nature. The second claim—that the only true knowledge was scientific knowledge from the scientific method—contradicted the Christian belief that all knowledge belonged to a Holy God. Gregg argues that both claims isolate science away from faith and subvert all belief in God. Science and faith were presented as mutually exclusive with science celebrated and faith mocked, but, quite unintentionally, the position science claimed and occupied alone would eventually subvert science and reason. We only need to look at current culture and the presence of Critical Theory as proof. It cares nothing for science or reason; it only cares for itself. There is no logic or scientific methodology; it alone is king and ruler. I would like to posit one notion to consider from this point forward: As the Enlightenment was attacking the Christian faith, it was also attacking itself; it just did not know it. 

The ideas and principles it deployed eventually came full circle and were deployed against it. Reason, the scientific method and humanism, all used by the Enlightenment to directly benefit itself, were critiqued, undermined and turned against it by other movements like Romanticism, Idealism, Rationalism and Postmodernism. They revealed that the limitations and exclusions the Enlightenment sought to eliminate from the world were alive and well inside its own ideas, in part, due to its own nature. It is this nature that was, in my opinion, adopted, manipulated and used by Critical Theory to assert itself in the West as the new authority. It is Critical Theory that now pushes the West to the brink of decline and death.  

Stay tuned for the last post in this series as I discuss where the West is now. Until then, remember thinking matters!  

The Rise and Fall of Western Civilization

by C. P. Lawrence

Part I: The Development of the West

I recently read an article about the decline and fall of the West, which produced a single thought in my mind in response to this article … Are we living through what many are calling the decline of the West or has the West already fallen? These two questions produced more thoughts and prompted me to do a little reading on the subject. In several articles I read one book was referenced more than all others, The Study of History by Toynbee. It turns out that this is not just any book but, by most accounts, a masterpiece when it comes to Western Civilization. Let me explain why. 

Arnold Toynbee suggested in his book that the West was already in sharp decline. Why did he do this? The Study of History is a multi-volume study of civilization, in which Toynbee studied twenty-one different civilizations across the span of human existence and concluded that nineteen of those twenty-one collapsed when they reached the current moral state of the United States, but here was the shocking part for me: He first published The Study of History in 1931, and in 1931 he posited that the West was in sharp decline and was, according to him, “rotting from within.” Toynbee died in 1975, but I wonder what he would think of our culture today. Are we living in a culture rotting from within or is it already dead?

With this post, I begin a series on the West with the goal of answer the question, is the West in decline or has it already fallen? There are several other excellent books devoted to this topic. Oswald Spengler wrote The Decline of the West, Christopher Dawson wrote Religion and the Rise of Western Culture and Tom Holland wrote Dominion and each author grappled with the same concept regarding the decline of Western Culture. Is Western Culture dead or is it in decline? Let’s find out together. First, let’s explore how the West came to be.   

I begin with Samuel Gregg and his book, Reason, Faith and the Struggle for Western Civilization, which is also excellent when it comes to our topic. In his book, he offers his account of the West, which is like the others but also nuanced with some differences. Gregg argues that Western Civilization was conceived in a marriage of Jerusalem and Athens. His answer is like many others and yet he posits that Western Civilization was born through a marriage of “faith and philosophy” in a version of Christianity born in the West that embraced and applied both faith and reason as one. He sees this “one” coming out of ancient Judaism, which he suggests was a synthesis of both faith and reason as applied in the living of life in a new way. Life was no longer about survival, at least not in the West; there were advancements that made life better and allowed progressions in thought and religion. Gregg states that Judaism “de-divinized nature” and was the first worldview/religion to completely reject the ancient idea that kings and rulers were divine and everyone else was to be under them. Judaism, unlike all other religions around it, offered the world a new king. Its rejection of the old idea was through a new view of the cosmos that was spiritually oriented. Judaism saw the cosmos as part of the created order of a universe created by a Holy God and because the universe was created by this Holy God it had order and intelligence and was not formless chaos as all others saw it. 

There was good, in time and space, and hope and all was not lost, according to Judaism, which was a much different narrative of the world than most other historical and religious narratives of the time. What Gregg was proposing was that in Judaism the Jews found a liberation of sorts of the cognitive from time and space. Judaism affirmed that there was a good God in heaven who was a Holy Creator God and that human beings were part of his created order, and not merely interchangeable parts of a larger machine. Human beings were seen as created in the image of this Creator God; they had purpose and were given responsibilities to live as moral beings in this created order. This was a radically different idea than all other ideas before it and what first makes Western Civilization unique. This was a vastly different worldview and would be distinctly western and a foundational mark of Western Civilization. 

The merging of Athens and Jerusalem cannot be underestimated as to its impact on Western Civilization and the Western mind, especially regarding our own current modern Western mindset in the United States. It is the United States that has been the pseudo-capital of Western Civilization for many years now, and it has been the United States that has served as the poster child of the West. The United States has impacted the West, including the Western mindset, more than most. And, now it is this mindset that has become compromised as referenced in part by Alan Bloom in his book, The Closing of the American Mind. It is the American mindset that was so free and so creative that now seems to be more vulnerable and more impacted than all others by the attacks against it. Bloom, in his book, attacks the moral relativism that he claimed was now in control of the colleges and universities. The very freedom brought to us by the West was the very thing being transformed before our eyes. Again, Bloom published his book in 1987, but he appeared to be saying some of the same things. The West, often seen through its colleges and universities, was in decline and dying back in 1987 according to Bloom.  

Back to Gregg, he references that Athens brought both contributions and obstacles to human thinking. It was Athens that was known for its skepticism, its irrationalities and its philosophies; most of them stood in stark contrast to the distinct and different worldview of Jerusalem (Judaism). So, how did they merge when all indications are that they should have clashed? The merging of Judaism and Greek thought, according to Gregg, predates Christianity, which is marked by the birth, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. There can be no denying the impact of Jesus Christ on the world regardless of your belief about him. Prior to Jesus Christ, educated Jews were more than familiar with Greek thought and moved easily back and forth between Hellenistic and Jewish thinking. This was due to purely pragmatic reasons as the Romans controlled the world and therefore controlled thinking. The Romans were borrowers and refiners. They invented little of their own, but they borrowed from those they conquered and bettered what they borrowed. The Romans allowed those they conquered to keep certain elements of their own culture if they accepted the elements of the Roman culture considered important. It was the Jews who were different than all other cultures; it was the Jews who had this One God who refused to bow down to any other god. Both the Romans and the Greeks viewed the Jews as barbarians. Why? Ironically, it had little to do with their religion and more to do with their thinking and their disposition. The simple answer was that they were not Roman or Greek; the better answer would be to say that they were not Western prior to Christianity. So, there it is … a connection between Christianity and Western Civilization. In my next post, I will explore this connection, but until then …    

Critical Theory: Part V

by C. P. Lawrence

Critical Theory: Part V

The Deconstruction and Development of a Theory That Is Critical  

I have now arrived at the point where I will pull back the layers of development regarding Critical Theory. Theory, before Critical Theory, had, as part of its composite, elements that were analytically oriented towards analysis with a distinct dialectic tendency. With this dialectic tendency, theory was considered a well-substantiated explanation of an aspect of the natural world. It required fluidity with an analytical orientation which allowed theorists, especially those in science, to make predictions based upon it being testable under controlled conditions in experiments. In the case of philosophy, theories were evaluated through principles in abductive reasoning and pushed to withstand scrutiny; they were used to test a thesis though the development of an anti-thesis, which was thought to confirm whether the original thesis was true or false. This element of theory was, for Horkheimer, problematic as the dialectic was not only rooted in science but also a benefactor of positivist protection. It was perceived as a process that revealed true scientific tendencies through objective means (positivism). Horkheimer recognized that theory, left untouched, did not have roots or tendencies towards Marxism nor would it ever have any of those tendencies unless its foundational structure changed. 

Horkheimer began the deconstruction of general theory by making a connection between theory and society, which pulled a distinctly social element into the perception of theory. He established this connection through what he called the savant or the specialist. This was an important step in the deconstruction of theory; he wrote regarding the specialist, “Particular traits in the theoretical activity of the specialist are here elevated to the rank of universal categories of instances of the world-mind, the eternal Logos.” His point was to establish that it was the individual (a member of society) that was the universal when it came to the theoretical (theory) because, according to Horkheimer, the universal was not theoretical or dialectic; it was, instead, individual genius. It was this push towards individual genius that also established theory as historical. He explained that the decisive elements of theory were nothing more than those activities of society, which are “reduced” to the theoretical through the activities of individuals in society, and in the case of theory, the activities of a specialist or of individual genius were activities of society. This tied theory to the social through the individual (either as a specialist or through individual genius), and it was the individual that rooted theory in the historical through the time and space occupied by the individual.  

In his union of theory and the individual, Horkheimer created a bridge from the theoretical to the social via the individual through individual genius, but it was the specialist whose activity he labeled as “the power of creative origination.” This activity, to a Marxist, was production, which Horkheimer labeled “creative sovereignty of thought,” which reinforced that even the individual’s thoughts were social and historical. This effectively removed scientific theory from its privileged and protected positivist (objective truth) position and reduced it to a social action. This was a line in the sand for Horkheimer … a risk he was willing to take. The risk—attacking the legitimacy of all other theories grounded in the scientific through his new “critical theory—was well worth it for him. Coming out of World War II and the oppressive reign of the Nazi war machine, he believed people were open to this radical change he proposed, especially if it “appeared” to bring back the civil liberties and the freedoms they had lost. 

For Critical Theory to live beyond its inception, it would need the idea of theory (the theoretical) to be re-cast as a different perception with a different semantical interpretation, one that embraced Critical Theory without requiring Critical Theory to embrace old ideas of theory, change to them or be compromised by them as applied by science. This new theory Horkheimer proposed had to exist as dominant while bringing change to the theories it encountered in ways that pushed them towards tendencies that were critical and Marxist, and the only way to do this was for it (Critical Theory) to be authoritative. When encountering all other theories it had to be “the” critical theory in each interaction. From my perspective, I do not believe this could have happened at any other point in history; after World War II and the Nazi regime’s widespread oppression, Horkheimer saw an opportunity and took it.  

Horkheimer, to usher in this change, pushed the theoretical to the point of instability, which produced doubt, setting it up to be re-established as “the” critical theory to remove the doubt that was now there. Theory, for Horkheimer, was now where it needed to be; it was no longer theoretical in any protected sense but instead, it was a true means of production. Its perception was now more a social function or an individual decision than anything theoretical, which made it part of production, which he labeled as a “production of unity,” which reduced production to that of a product. Horkheimer never saw production as something that produces a product; he saw production only as a product of culture, manifesting in the same ways as other cultural products. For him, it had to be a means of production that could be controlled by Marxism. If production was no longer a process of “becoming,” then it would be open to “becoming” something new, something with Marxist tendencies, especially if it was firmly entrenched in the social and the historic. As a product that was social and historic, it would now be oriented towards individual tendencies (the savant or the specialist), opening it up to cultural changes and semantical shifts with distinctly Marxist orientations. 

As a product, the process of production was now categorical, easily manipulated and positioned to be re-formed in a different light. Horkheimer’s attack comes full circle, when he wrote, “In reality, the scientific calling is only one, non-independent element in the work of historical activity of man, but in such a philosophy the former replaces the latter.” Linking theory to history allowed it to be supple in much the same way history was, which positioned theory to be pliable … more open to revisions, changes and the influence of propaganda, which would allow it to be impacted by the orientations of scholars and theorists addressing it in much the same way history was addressed. This pliability that was now attached to scientific theory was no longer fluid in any natural sense but mechanical in every aspect of its movement. Its movements were intentional, which allowed it to be manipulated through the power functions of those overseeing it. It would become dependent on individuals and their interpretations, orientations and contexts and it would no longer be dialectic. This created space for Critical Theory to move into and take over the theoretical through the individual.  

As I read Horkheimer’s essay, his attack on the theoretical was on full display; he saw all dominant theories and philosophies, as well as those objects we perceive as natural—cities, towns, fields, and woods—as bearing the marks of man and shaped by man’s oppression. They were products of society to him, the means of production and in a perfect Marxist world, equally distributed to all and not left to the bourgeois to manage and control. He was clearly now viewing theory, through a distinctly Marxist lens, as social and historical. Theory was part of society and tainted in all the same ways; Horkheimer wrote regarding society, “The existence of society has either been founded directly on oppression or been the blind outcome of conflicting forces, but in any event not the result of conscious spontaneity on the part of free individuals.” This one statement about society was also to be applied to theory, prior to his deconstruction of it. He saw society as that which was built intentionally with ill intentions. He wrote regarding this thought, “As man reflectively records reality, he separates and rejoins pieces of it, and concentrates on some particulars while failing to notice others.” Those concepts of recording, separating and rejoining are conscious intentional actions impacted by the beliefs and values of those individuals determining the recorded, separated and rejoined. Horkheimer bemoaned the intentionality of society and saw its structure as intentionally created to give the bourgeois everything at the expense of everyone else, and yet he used it to deconstruct theory and recreate it as Critical Theory.  

What Horkheimer initiated so many years ago has come to fruition. Horkheimer has essentially replaced theory with a “critical” theory that is analytically and distinctly Marxist. He took the theoretical, and its dialectic orientation and replaced its praxis with a Marxist one. The authoritative nature of theory, which has been assumed, especially in science, to possess an objective ability to confirm what is true, has now been taken over by a Marxist orientation with intentions oriented towards Marxist truisms. It is Marxist tendencies that are now dominant inside theory. They have been reconfigured to analyze other non-Marxist theories in critical ways … to cast doubt on them until they are overrun by this new configured “critical” theory. In the end, they either submit to it or die. This is Critical Theory; it was created to be “the” critical theory of all theories and to leave Marxism in a dominant position in science and ultimately in society. This is where we find our world today … right where Horkheimer and his colleagues had hoped it would be. It is Critical Theory that drives the ideas in our colleges, pushes the bills in our government and changes the norms in our culture and every idea, bill and norm has tendencies that are critical and distinctly Marxist. As we look at our culture and ask, how did we get here? There is but one answer … Critical Theory! Stay tuned for the next installment of this series. Until then, remember, thinking does matter!   

Critical Theory: Part IV

by C. P. Lawrence

Critical Theory: Part IV

The Creation of “Critical” Theory

In my last post, I suggested that Horkheimer, to create his new “theory” had to re-create the general idea of theory itself. I posited my own assertions, which, if I am honest, are based strictly on my reading of his essay and my own convictions formed from that reading, which is my attempt to stay inside the spirit of Critical Theory. I tried to limit my secondary sources and keep his essay front and center with little to no outside interference. Right or wrong, I am left with my own assertions; whether they are corroborated by others or even valid seems to me of little consequence considering what I have read so far in his essay. 

In a world of Critical Theory, one of the first impressions that came to me was this one: there are no rules. I need only to assert my ideas in persuasive sincere ways and that should be enough, but that is problem. It should never be enough; It should require more because, like it or not, they are my perceptions and those will always be based on me. It is the same with Marxists, Idealists and Pragmatists; beliefs and values always turn into perceptions. The important point is not to assert your perceptions as true but to determine whether your perceptions are true. Let’s jump right into this post with my own assertion.

My initial assertion regarding Horkheimer’s work on theory begins with this thought: to make it “critical” would require it be fully “critical” from all angels and for all situations. The only way I see this being accomplished is if Critical Theory becomes the dominant theory over all other theories. Regardless of the validity of my claim, to answer that question I must examine, in detail, his attack on theory, or the theoretical (I reference it at times this way to clarify it from the categorical or the practical), because whether right or wrong, it reads as an attack to me. My perception is impacted by his statements; for example, he wrote, “The traditional idea of theory is based on scientific activity as carried on within the division of labor at a particular stage in the latter’s development.” Here Horkheimer seemed to direct his attack against theory by linking traditional theory directly to the action of the individual engaged in the theory, and in doing so, he presented the idea that the scientific action of a theory was no different than any “other activities of a society.” What I believe he was positing was that the individual action of employing a theory was, in substance and essence, no different than the individual action of a teacher, a coach or any other person acting according to their own convictions as a member of society; they are all social actions, which, in a subtle way, places science in a position to be overrun by Marxism. 

I do not believe his point here was to destroy theory but, to keep it in a state of flux to be used for his purposes. I believe he meant to link current theory to the individual for the purposes of giving the individual power over the theoretical process, which ultimately was a connection to the means of production via the individual. Inside Marxism, the individual and their actions would always be considered a means of production. Regarding this, he wrote, “… the real social function of science is not made manifest; it speaks not of what theory means in human life, but only what it means in the isolated sphere in which for historical reasons it comes into existence.” In this one statement, he reinforced his reduction of science to that of a social function and presented it with Marxist tendencies: as a means of production. With no pressure to defend his assertion, he proceeded to “deconstruct” out the “positivist protection” that science enjoyed, which would always present it as true and never as a means of production.   

The result of this deconstruction was a reduction of the theoretical to a position where it would meet all the requirements to be a means of production, but he also does something else that was equally important. He plants into the discussion a subtle historical reference (“historical reasons”). This historical reference completes this reduction of science, from that of a theoretical process with positivist protection (my phrase) to one that was now an action resulting from an individual choice in time and space. This is important because, as a historical reference, the reduction of science was complete, He had moved it out of the theoretical realm and placed it firmly into the social realm, where it will be at the mercy of Marxism as a means of production.

Horkheimer next took aim at society, which he viewed from a distinctly Marxist perspective. He defined society, as “the result of all the work” of all sectors of production in culture. His negative view of capitalism stemmed from his belief that it was the bourgeois in a capitalist state who would be the ones benefitting from the labor of everyone in society, which, for him, was categorically unfair and oppressive. This categorical oppressiveness, for Horkheimer, even extended to all ideas and thoughts of a society. For Horkheimer the necessity of re-establishing the conception of theory in a Marxist tradition was priority one in his development of a new “critical” theory fully capable of competing against those theories already established and dominant. For it to have a chance it needed a cultural foundation that would welcome it and allow it to grow and to have that foundation, he would have to destroy the ideas of capitalism, which operated on ideas like supply and demand and Smith’s invisible hand, which would be almost impossible to control from a Marxist position. He would borrow the radical doubt of Descartes to accomplish this task.  

Horkheimer understood that every dominant theory, once doubted, would be less dominant and more vulnerable. For Critical Theory to take hold it had to be the critical lens used in analysis of all other theories and part of that critical analysis had to be doubt, which once used in analysis, by Critical Theory was left attached to the theory analyzed. Horkheimer’s goal was that one day Critical Theory would be the dominant worldview, but the current state of science, with its theoretical roots in qualitative and quantitative methodology, would destroy Critical Theory if it were not first destroyed. For Horkheimer, this was his motivation for his attack on the concept of theory. It was also why he used the radical doubt of Descartes in his critical analysis of theory to change it and then recreate it in the image of Critical Theory.

In his essay, Horkheimer dictated how theory was to be recreated semantically and culturally to reflect Marxist beliefs, and then he labeled this theory as “critical” and used it for critical analysis over all other theories. Horkheimer hoped to accomplish two tasks with his recreation of theory: he would eliminate the original idea of theory, which was a threat to Critical Theory, and recreated it in the image of Marxism. Second, he would use this recreated and reconstructed theory as vehicle to deliver Critical Theory in ways that would assert it as a worldview and as dominant. As we look out at our world, what do we see today? We see those dominant theories of the past willfully submitting to the whims and desires of Critical Theory. 

It is Critical Theory that has become the lens of critical analysis, leading the charge to canceling dominant theories of the past and open the cultural door for new theories to come rushing in and these theories connect with no other theories. They make no sense when it comes to science or even medicine and yet, the take hold, are defended and are profoundly impact culture. We need only to look back and ask a few questions. When it comes to Critical Theory, where is dialectic thought? What about the antithesis? We see those theories of the past cast into the darkness of doubt by the shadow of Critical Theory, and they either align with or, in some cases, are replaced by Critical Theory or they fade away and die.  

This is our world today. It is a world where Critical Theory has become more dominant than we even realize, and that is by design. My next post will explore how theory became “critical” theory, with the hope of educating all of us in ways that will help us identify Critical Theory and its impact. Until then …  

Critical Theory: Part II

by C. P. Lawrence

Making Sense of the Chaos

In the next several posts, we will look at Critical Theory through Max Horkheimer’s 1937 essay “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in which he first defines Critical Theory through the contrast of it with other traditional theories. It was Horkheimer who presented the agenda for the Frankfurt School in his 1931 lecture given upon receiving the directorship of the Institute of Social Research. In that lecture, Horkheimer proposed merging philosophy and social theory with psychology, political economy and cultural analysis in ways that developed a social philosophy capable of truly interpreting social reality, which, was and still is an important concept of Marxism, but there was more. He also implied that this process of interpretation of social reality would also create opportunities to change social reality. Why was that important? 

Social reality through a Marxist lens is always perceived to be bias (unless it is Marxist) and rooted in a class struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie (or capitalists). Marx saw capitalism like he saw all societies of the past, rooted in slave labor. To him, they were the same; their class struggles were similar with one smaller group exploiting everyone else for their own benefit, which is why he advocated, as a true Marxist, for the common ownership of the means of production. He believed common ownership would eliminate the profit motive, which he saw as one of the main causes of class struggle. He advocated replacing it with a motive for human flourishing, but time has not been kind to Marxism. Common ownership of the means of production has been used, not to produce human flourishing, but, instead, to oppress and crush human flourishing through the vehicle of communism. It is in communism where we find much of the tyranny and the oppression in our world today, and it is also in communism where we find more suffering than flourishing. Critical Theory is not Marxism, at least it is not supposed to be. How is it different? 

Horkheimer used social sciences as the standard for Critical Theory because he found that the social sciences modeled themselves after the natural sciences, which root themselves in empirical social research. This was important for him, but there was also the issue of a distinctly positivist orientation, which he had to address (Positivism is the idea that every assertion can be scientifically or mathematically verified which justifies the rejection of metaphysics and theism.). This positivist view of the world is still how we tend to see knowledge production today; it is true if proven by quantitative research (that which roots itself in the mathematical and the scientific), which make most of us positivist-bias, trusting only science and math as the means to truth. Truth is found by both objective and subjective means. Critical Theory not only does not embrace positivist theory, but it is slowly trying to replace it with itself, which was Horkheimer’s solution to this issues.  

When we examine Critical Theory, we find that it reflects only on its own origins, which are subjective and murky at best. This is one reason why Critical Theory moves away from a positivist view of the world … Critical Theory is primarily subjective; it depends on intentionality and seeks to leave space for newly created theories and philosophies with a distinctly Critical Theory orientation. It also embraces “an interdisciplinary methodology,” as I have highlighted, that seeks to bridge the gap between research that is empirical and research that is rooted in what one author called, “the philosophical thinking needed in the correlation of history and empiricism.” That bridge between, that which is static, in the past, (history) and, that which is experienced, in the present (empirical) is one that must be traveled. For a Marxist, it is an easy journey across, but for all others, it is one full of potholes and difficulties, which is seen as opportunity by the Marxist. One theorist put it this way, “Critical theory aims not merely to describe social reality, but to generate insights into the forces of domination operating within society in a way that can inform practical action and stimulate change.” Again, we cannot forget the Marxist view of social reality and the struggle they see in it. Critical Theory seeks to determine the best ways to undermine current social reality—because they see it as oppression—to prepare it for its own Marxist reality. 

One of the first and most fundamental goals of Critical Theory is to unite theory and practice, not to discover that which is true, but to form a “dynamic unity with the oppressed class.” This unity of theory and practice in Critical Theory is not a unity as much as it is takeover. Both theory and practice must submit to the subjectivity of Critical Theory in ways that transform, allowing for the formation of a dynamic unity with the oppressed class. When this transformation takes place, research, whether quantitative or qualitative, takes a hit and becomes something it was not supposed to be … tainted with intentionality and the subjectivity of Critical Theory. For Critical Theory to be itself, it required an intentionality, rooted in its subjectivity, forcing both theory and practice to surrender to the subjectivity of Critical Theory. It is the subjectivity of Critical Theory that is king in all its encounters, and this is by design.  

Horkheimer, in the opening paragraph of his essay stated, “The real validity of the theory depends on the derived propositions being consonant with the actual facts. If experience and theory contradict each other, one of the two must be reexamined.” This reexamination was the change Critical Theory brought to theory, but it could only happen if theory had already surrendered its past. In the past, if experience and theory contradicted each other the hypothesis was incorrect. For example, if my theory is that the sun will not come up tomorrow and I wake up and run to the window and see the sun then my hypothesis is not correct, forcing me to change my hypothesis. In Critical Theory, it is the hypothesis that has taken the place of practice and theory. It is no longer the hypothesis that determines the truth of a theory; Critical Theory is the truth and all other factors, including a hypothesis, are to be its subjects.

If experience and theory contradict each other something is wrong, but what? A theory that needs adjustment to align with experience is not really a theory but merely an assembly line of options that can be adjusted to produce the desired product. The idea of experience and theory in Critical Theory is not theoretical in any sense of the word; it is instead pragmatic, practical and interchangeable. Adjustments are sought to determine how to align experience with theory to create a social philosophy capable of changing theory first, but ultimately changing society. Horkheimer’s response to the contradiction of theory and experience was that either the scientist failed to observe correctly, or the principles of the theory were wrong, but we have to ask this question: are we talking about allowing the research to speak or using the research to speak for us? 

Horkheimer quotes Husserl’s definition of a theory: “an enclosed system of propositions for science as a whole.” The basic requirement of any theoretical system ultimately is harmony, but that harmony comes at the expense of the friction before it, and yet, there are indications that Critical Theory sought to keep and maybe even use the friction of other systems to destabilize them so that Critical Theory could be the harmony that these systems sought. Horkheimer references that the basic requirement of a theoretical system is “that all parts should intermesh thoroughly and without friction,” but then, he seems to lament that this traditional conception expresses a tendency towards “a purely mathematical system of symbols.” He goes on to reference that in large areas of natural science theory the formation has become a matter of mathematical construction. Horkheimer is implying that traditional theory is stuck in the rut of describing social institutions and situations as they are. Their analyses do not incorporate the Marxist view of social reality rooted in class struggle and oppression and therefore they have little to no effect on repression and class struggle. Horkheimer sought to build Critical Theory as the opposite of traditional theories, as that with a direct effect on social reality to answer the repression and struggle he saw in society.

As I close this post, let me encourage you to come back for Part III as I attempt to add more clarity to the confusing world of Critical Theory. Until then … 

Critical Theory: Part I

by C. P. Lawrence

Clarity for the Obscure

This post begins a series on Critical Theory as I attempt to bring a little clarity to that which is obscure, or at least seems obscure. It is always difficult to bring clarity to something that seeks to remain obscure (please note this reference). Is this the nature of Critical Theory or does it just appear this way to those of us unfamiliar with it? The conjectural nature of Critical Theory does position it to be distorted but is that distortion just part of its fabric or is it intentional? Good questions that demand answers, which is the purpose of this series. It will be a bit like nailing Jello to the wall … you will soon see what I mean. 

Let’s begin with the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which describes Critical Theory as a phrase that “does not refer to one theory but, instead, to a family of theories” which are designed to critique society through the assimilation of chosen normative perceptions through the empirical analysis of current societal norms. I know what you are thinking … what does all of that mean? Hidden behind this loquacious description is an agenda that is intent on many things but do not miss that changing the world is one of those intents. 

Let’s begin by dissecting this murky explanation of Critical Theory provided to us. What it says to us is that Critical Theory was intentionally created to be integrated in manners that disrupt the dominant norms of society through an intentionally-created analysis to deconstruct dominant norms into fragments that can then generate a praxis of sorts which can be applied to current culture, produce norms with Marxist tendencies. Whew! I am not sure that I provide much clarity, but in short, the idea is to provide Marxism an opportunity to become a worldview that can be applied in all situations throughs ways in which it can become the dominant worldview. Again, the goal is to gain a dominant foothold in mainstream society. All references to Critical Theory (and it is always capitalized as a proper noun) are references to the work of several generations of philosophers and theorists, all with foundations in the Marxist tradition. It is truly not just one theory but many theories working together for one common goal. Clear as mud, right. Let me provide a little historical context with the hope that it adds some lucidity.  

The whole idea started with the son of Herman Weil. Herman Weil was an exporter of grain. He made a fortune exporting grain from Argentina to Europe. Felix Weil inherited his father’s fortune, but instead of using it to broaden the family business, he used it to found an institute devoted to the study of German society through a distinctly Marxist approach. Not long after the initial inception, the Institute of Social Research, as it was to be known, was formed and formally recognized by the Ministry of Education as part of the Goethe University Frankfurt. The first appointed director was Carl Grunberg (1923-29), a Marxist professor from the University of Vienna. The institute was known for its work which combined philosophy and social science, two distinct and separate fields of study at the time, in ways that were informed by Marxism. As for the term, Max Horkheimer first defined it in his essay, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in 1937. I will be referencing and quoting from this essay in this series. 

Today, Critical Theory, is composed of many different strands of emerging forms of engagement in all areas of culture, all coming together to destabilize current dominant norms into positions of weakness. In these positions of weakness, the intent is to introduce forms of Critical Theory that eventually erode the dominant ideas and replace them with ideas rooted in and composed of Marxism. The entire process was an attempt to normalize Marxism and package it in a way that allowed it to be transformed into the norms of society. This became known as the “Frankfurt School” of critical theory, and as we will find out, they were very successful. 

This school is not really a “school” in any sense of the word but a loosely held (critical) tradition or belief system that is bonded by critiques on how to best define and develop the (critical) tradition in ways that will push it into mainstream society. Marxism’s largest deficit was thought to be its absence in mainstream society; it was thought that if it could just be applied and lived out by more people it would be embraced and change culture. The movement was meant to correct this perceived deficit through a more expansive means that would extend its roots deep into culture and provide more people the means to embrace it. The initial efforts of the (critical) tradition attempted to combine philosophy and social science into an applicable theory that would serve as a door into mainstream culture; it was created with “liberating intent” (with a goal of freeing society from the current dominant norms), but here is an important part of the application of this theory. These philosophers were patient; they understood that what they wanted to accomplish would take time. It would actually take generations of philosophers pursuing the same theories in the same manners to claim any ground in mainstream society. The first generation of these philosophers were, what has been called, “methodologically innovative” in their approach to developing this (critical) tradition. Marxism was their vehicle of change; it was also their product, which they hoped would become dominant part of society. They integrated it with the work of Sigmund Freud, Max Weber and Fredrich Nietzsche, each had made their own inroads in society, using their work in secondary ways to develop a model of critique anchored in, what is known today as, Critical Theory.

Some of the prominent first-generation philosophers were Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin and Jurgen Habermas, who is still a important figure of second-generation philosophers in Critical Theory. In what is sometimes known as the third sense of Critical Theory, the work of Michel Foucault and Jacque Derrida was referenced and used to advance the tradition due to their associations with psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, with particular interest in Derrida’s theories of deconstruction. Once a workable tradition (theory) was created, it was used as a means of analysis of a wide range of phenomena—from authoritarianism to capitalism to democracy. Each analysis drew Critical Theory closer to the pillars of society ­—the family, the church and the school—and to the replacement of a moral paideia with one with Marxism foundations. Today, we see evidence of its presence in a wide range of cultural norms, including in how we live, think and act. Its influence is wide and deep and extends into many areas of current culture in such a complete way that there are elements of Critical Theory in our lives that we don’t even consider Critical Theory. 

As I close this post, my goal was to give you a macro-picture of Critical Theory. I hope you are now a little closer to understanding it than you were before you read this. In my ensuing posts, I will begin to unpack the tradition so that we not only understand it, but we can also identify it and the areas of our own lives it is impacting. This is why thinking matters to all of us.