Critical Theory

The Rise and Fall of Western Civilization: Part V

by C. P. Lawrence

Part V: Death

In my last post, I posited the idea that in the West we stopped pursuing morality in the name of freedom but that is only half the story. We stopped pursuing morality to fully embrace freedom as our new morality. This new morality functioned as the pursuit of whatever we wanted, making freedom something it was never intended to be. It became you and me at the expense of “we.” Freedom will stop being freedom when morality is removed, and when it becomes about you and me it is already gone. We, as human beings, will never stop pursuing. In most cases, we will pursue our own needs and desires, which sounds nice and sounds safe but, it eventually leads to darker places like narcissism and nihilism.

Today, we are told that we are free, and it is Critical Theory that has freed us. It has unshackled us from the chains that have bound us, but were they really binding us? What if those chains were not binding but restraining? What if they were restraining us from becoming evil, from our own demise and from excess? It is excess that the West has given to us as freedom. Let’s be clear: excess is not freedom, and it never will be, and yet, it defines us. It is our desire; it is our dream. Does having more make us free; does it make us happier? I do know that having more makes us want more, and that is not freedom. That is addiction; that is bondage. When we get more, we want more; it never seems to be enough. That sounds oddly familiar, like something else entirely … something at odds with freedom. What happens when I want something that you want? Is that freedom or are we back to a “survival of the fittest” mentality? Maybe, we never left? 

Marxism in the West has taken on many forms and addressed many issues, but it has accomplished its greatest task. It has made the West a land of individualism. We are promised everything, and we have been conditioned to believe that we can have everything. It is this promise that has become our idol, worshipped by everyone at the expense of everyone. Remember Spengler’s critique of civilization, excess was not a point of celebration but a point of concern. It was a warning bell and a flashing red light. In the West, we no longer hear the warning bells or see the flashing red lights? Why? Excess is who we are. This wanting more … it is always there, pushing us to think about ourselves, and every time we do, it is at the expense of someone else. We no longer see others. We only see ourselves. This is what excess does … others become obstacles preventing us from getting more. 

Excess has seeped into our being. It now defines our excellence and is our passion. More is better, easier and what we want most. Best is a distant memory. Excess produces no loyalty, no common sense and no honor; there is only individualism and the striving for more. When we stop and look in the mirror, we see something unfamiliar, something we no longer recognize. We have been living in this land of excess for too long. Excess has become who we are. We think it is good for us, but it is a sickness that is slowly killing us. We are no longer ashamed our actions; we no longer take responsibility for anything. We stopped seeking humility long ago. Our only concern is to get as much as we can for as long as we can.  

This is the West. Excess has replaced our desire for excellence and our concern about goodness with itself; all we want and care about is more. Sound familiar? This is you and me. This is survival of the fittest, chaos theory and AI all rolled up into one. This is what death looks like at the cellular level right before oncosis. Our concern is for ourselves at the expense of everyone else, and it is not moral, not ethical and certainly not civil. It is gluttony; it is embracing profligacy as if it is the air we breathe and the water we drink. Excess has become life to us. We have been told that we can have it all and we have believed that we could, never giving a second thought to what getting it all would do to us or do to others. Just look out your window and watch the world for a moment. What do you see? Bigger, better, more … everywhere. No one is immune. Excess is us and it is everywhere. 

It is 2025; there are few if any traces remaining of the West and its past. The Athens of old is gone and so is Rome, but there is America. It is the land of opportunity, the shining star of the West. It represents all that we could ever want. Is it the West or something else? One author put it this way: “Call American civilization brutish, materialist, or racist (it has been called all of those things), but don’t call it Western. Western civilization declined and fell a century ago, and it’s not coming back.” In other words, the West (America) is not sick; it is not in decline. It is not being rescued or revitalized. It is dead. 

The West is dead. We have been living in its decay and rot for some time now. And, to make matters worse, we killed it. That’s right and its death was due to our individualized gourmandizing. It was our wanting more … our never being content with what we have. We embraced excess without considering the consequences and, there are always consequences. We did not think it would matter, but we should have known better. We should have known that having it all was not possible; that everyone can’t be excellent, happy and wealthy all at the same time. Individual fulfillment does not produce collective excellence, community or even a future and it never will. I thought we learned this lesson over 200 years ago. Have we forgotten them already? 

It is the end of the story for the West. There is no looking back nor is there wishful thinking. Death is final. There are no second chances and no rescues. Death is death. There is now only looking forward towards a new beginning. This is the way of civilizations; instead of mourning death and avoiding it, we should embrace it because the end of one thing is always the beginning of something new. The death of the West means something new is coming, or it might already be here. It might not be what you want or what I want, but it will not be what we have known. It will be different. We have a choice. We can sit and wait, or we can be part of its development. The choice is yours; the choice is mine. Let’s hope that we make a better choice this time. Let’s hope we are together and not apart, and that we have not forgotten the hard lessons of the past as we move into new beginnings. We will need to remember them, or we will be doomed to repeat them. 

This concludes this series. I hope you enjoyed it. Until next time …  

The Rise and Fall of Western Civilization: Part III

by C. P. Lawrence

The Roman siege of Jerusalem in 70 C.E.

Part III: The Beginning of the End

Many consider the “West” a nebulous term with no meaning and no history and yet most consider it in decline. As I have referenced, when Oswald Spengler published his epic, The Decline of the West, he posited that the West “wasn’t just in decline; it was being dragged under.” His thesis was that all “cultures” go through a process of birth, blossoming, fruit production and withering to the point of death. The withering phase he called “civilization” because he associated it with a process within the withering phase of excess, debilitation, loss of identity and finally, death. Spengler first published his masterpiece in 1918, and at that time, he saw the West in the withering stage. As he pointed out, the beginning of the withering stage is excess. When civilizations reach the point of excess they become fat; that is not a point of celebration but one of warning. Spengler saw the West at this stage, which forces us to consider a question we would rather not: where is the West now? 

Let’s be clear: the West is not a country, nor does it have geographical boundaries, but it does have a birth, and because it has a birth, it will ultimately have a death. Its birth, according to Spengler, occurred with the fusion of German nobility and the Western Roman Empire, as Spengler saw his native Germany as part of the West. Others point to the marriage of Athens and Jerusalem, but all are references to the merging of the two known worlds at the time into something new and different. Spengler thought the West “blossomed” in the Italian Renaissance, bloomed in the Baroque period and produced its greatest fruit in the 19th century. Gregg posited that the Enlightenment was one example of its fruit, but fruit is only good for a time; eventually it rots.

The Enlightenment, most would say, was not united with Christianity but instead at odds with it. Gregg rejects that idea and any idea that the Enlightenment advanced individual reason at the expense of personal faith. He acknowledges the rise of and focus on reason, but he also points to examples of reason and faith coming together for good during the Enlightenment. He presents one important Enlightenment figure in support of his supposition: Sir Isaac Newton. It was thought that Newton wrote his Principia Mathematica in response to the “materialist assumptions” of Rene Descartes and his views on planetary movements. Newton believed that the entire cosmos, including planetary movement, were governed by a Holy God and his divine providence. It was his faith that drove him to study the world and understand it. Many Enlightenment thinkers considered religion as superstition, but others, like Newton, did not.

As far as products of the Enlightenment, the founding of America is often referenced as one of its greatest. While there is evidence to support this assertion, there is also evidence, i.e., its foundational documents, that tell another story; one where its founders grounded virtue and human morality in reason bathed in a belief of divine goodness. Those Enlightenment ideas that were at odds with the Christian faith coincide with the rise of reductionism and the scientific method as both were coming of age at this time. It was reductionism and modern science that attacked faith, presenting it as incompatible with reason, for the purpose of crowning reason as the only king.   

According to Gregg, there were two claims that severed the reason of Enlightenment with the Christian faith; the first was the belief that there was no fixed human nature, which clashed directly with the Christian belief of a sinful human nature. The second claim—that the only true knowledge was scientific knowledge from the scientific method—contradicted the Christian belief that all knowledge belonged to a Holy God. Gregg argues that both claims isolate science away from faith and subvert all belief in God. Science and faith were presented as mutually exclusive with science celebrated and faith mocked, but, quite unintentionally, the position science claimed and occupied alone would eventually subvert science and reason. We only need to look at current culture and the presence of Critical Theory as proof. It cares nothing for science or reason; it only cares for itself. There is no logic or scientific methodology; it alone is king and ruler. I would like to posit one notion to consider from this point forward: As the Enlightenment was attacking the Christian faith, it was also attacking itself; it just did not know it. 

The ideas and principles it deployed eventually came full circle and were deployed against it. Reason, the scientific method and humanism, all used by the Enlightenment to directly benefit itself, were critiqued, undermined and turned against it by other movements like Romanticism, Idealism, Rationalism and Postmodernism. They revealed that the limitations and exclusions the Enlightenment sought to eliminate from the world were alive and well inside its own ideas, in part, due to its own nature. It is this nature that was, in my opinion, adopted, manipulated and used by Critical Theory to assert itself in the West as the new authority. It is Critical Theory that now pushes the West to the brink of decline and death.  

Stay tuned for the last post in this series as I discuss where the West is now. Until then, remember thinking matters!  

Critical Theory: Part VI

by C. P. Lawrence

Critical Theory: Part VI

Critical Theory as the Norm

We have now come full circle to the point where the theory is to be normalized. As Horkheimer and others developed this theory, the initial intentions, I believe, were rooted in standardizing it in ways that positioned it to become “normalized” in culture. To do this positivism and interaction with it had to be addressed; it was, for all intents and purposes, foundational to almost everything … science, philosophy and even worldview. Horkheimer, in his essay, intentionally presented Critical Theory as if it had positivist intentions; he wrote, “In so far as this traditional conception of theory shows a tendency, it is towards a purely mathematical system of symbols. As elements of the theory, as components of the propositions and conclusions, there are ever fewer names of experimental objects and ever more numerous mathematical symbols.” While it appeared in this statement that Horkheimer embraced positivism, we learn later in his essay that he did not embrace positivism as it was, but as it needed to be for Critical Theory to assume its dominant position in culture. He saw the positivism that he encountered in much the same light as capitalism, as that which was “dominated by industrial production techniques,” or by the bourgeois, and as that which needed change.   

To combat the positivist dominance he encountered, Horkheimer, as I highlighted in an earlier post, destabilized traditional theory, which was foundational to positivism, allowing Critical Theory the needed space to surpass positivism. To do this, he believed that Critical Theory must be capable of doing two things: it must push traditional theory to view culture within a historical context, which I discussed at length earlier on why this was important, and its critique must incorporate all the social sciences. Horkheimer explained that a theory can only be considered “a true critical theory if it is explanatory, practical and normative,” but to do this required the presence of all social sciences in its foundation and its practice. His theory must explain social issues through practical means in responses that stay inside the parameters of the field addressed, much like traditional theory, but it also must speak to and address all of culture to change it. This was “critical” theory and Horkheimer and others created it to be much different than traditional theory. 

By offering a “critical” theory rooted in all social sciences that addressed a field while speaking to and addressing all of culture, Horkheimer presented a better and more improved theoretical option, but for whom? His “critical” theory was constructed to present Marxism as the norm and position it to assume the dominant positions of culture. Through his “critical” theory, he deconstructed “traditional” theory and its production for one reason; his perception was that traditional theory failed to address power and the status quo through the social sciences. Horkheimer presented Critical Theory as a theory that not only addressed power and the status quo but would use the former to deconstruct and the latter to fundamentally change the foundation of traditional theory, creating the means for Critical Theory to engage and transform culture.  

Traditional theory has long been confined to the field it served, and it worked best inside the parameters of that specific field because its goals were confirming true propositions within specific fields. Critical Theory, while technically not part of science, was built to interact aggressively with all fields, including science, for greater purposes. Its interests extended beyond specific fields and into culture itself, positioning itself as dominant over all fields for the purpose of changing culture and the norms of it. Critical Theory was to interact with all of culture through power structures where it assumed the dominant position. Its goals were not confined to one experiment or one field; instead, they were much larger and more broad, purposeful and directed at cultural transformation. 

Traditional theory had always focused on coherency and on the distinction between theory and praxis within intimate settings. It followed the Cogito in its view of knowledge, embracing the idea that knowledge was grounded in self-evident propositions, which Horkheimer used to introduce the idea of individual genius into the concept of traditional theory. Traditional theory typically explained facts through the application of universal truths or laws by subsumption that either confirmed or denied the truth proposition proposed. Horkheimer, as I discussed, posited that the “universal” part of the theoretical equation was rooted in the individual and not in the process, which rooted traditional theory in time and space, leaving it exposed. To confirm truth, traditional theory willingly partnered with positivism, rooting itself in an objective process, which had historically been considered the better option of confirming scientific investigative truth. Traditional theory would defend a scientific truth through empirical confirmation which embraced the idea of an objective world where knowledge was confirmed through empirical means, thought to be a mirror of reality. This view was not only rejected by Critical Theory but overrun and changed by it. 

Horkheimer and, for the most part, all the Frankfurt School, rejected the notion of the objectivity of knowledge due to its historical and social foundation, which, ironically, came courtesy of Horkheimer’s hand and was used later to normalize Critical Theory. Horkheimer wrote, “The facts which our senses present to us are socially performed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiving organ.” In other words, Horkheimer, with this statement, was confirming that it was the individual genius of the observer that made traditional theory work, which positioned it in time and space, allowing it to be overrun by the “better” and more dominant Critical Theory. Traditional theory, with its roots in an objective view of knowledge, was now susceptible to Critical Theory because of its objectivity, which was now grounded in the time and space of the individual and not in the dialectic process of theory. This made traditional theory historical, which exposed its past dominance, making it as vulnerable to the criticisms of Marxism as everything else. Critical Theory, for Horkheimer, was that which would solve the issue of the “partiality” of the “culturally impacted” observer and of the past dominance of the oppressors; for Horkheimer, it was Critical Theory that would free individuals from what he saw as their entanglement in a social embedded perspective of interdependent oppression. 

Traditional theory, historically, had been evaluated through practical implications with no real practical consequences of significance outside its field; knowledge, as a mirror of reality, was more a “theoretically-oriented” tool than anything else, which clarified knowledge as a product and one that was objective. Critical theory was presented as “the” theory, void of any kind of bias towards knowledge that is objective; it presented itself as that which considered knowledge through functional relationships to ideologies and societal liberties. Considering this perception, knowledge becomes what Critical Theory needs it to be … societal critique, cultural action and subjective, directly impacted by the dominant and ultimately a means to transform reality. This is where we find ourselves today, living in a reality that is being transformed before our eyes. So, how do we recognize Critical Theory as we live each day?

Six Ways to Recognize Critical Theory:

Here are six ways to recognize Critical Theory in everyday life. First, Critical Theory views language as a social activity and as a vehicle of ideology so the adage, “sticks and stone may break my bones, but words will never hurt me” is wrong to Critical Theorists. Words will hurt you and are considered harmful to advocates of Critical Theory therefore, they need to be attacked and treated as acts, and those inside Critical Theory will treat them accordingly. Words will be attacked and treated as criminal acts. Second, there will be no rules associated with anything rooted in Critical Theory for one purpose; it is Critical Theory that is the ultimate authority, and it makes all the rules. If norms are being assessed and critiqued through Critical Theory, almost anything goes. Stealing, vandalism, rioting, and fighting are all justified if they are manifestations of the oppressed who are “rightfully” pushing back against their oppressors. Who are the oppressed? Well, they are anyone who has not been in a position of power in the past regardless of their personal efforts. Third, those critiquing and assessing generally have authority even if they have no experience in the area that they are critiquing and assessing. Their authority comes from believing and rooting themselves in Critical Theory, which is ultimately “the” authority over all fields and all theories. For example, a political philosopher critiquing a medical procedure with no formal medical training will have more authority than the medical professional due to the authority of Critical Theory. We can expect to see more of this if Critical Theory continues to rule. 

Continuing, fourth, there will generally be hypocrisy associated with any movement made under the authority of Critical Theory. For example, those condemning wealthy company CEOs and their high salaries who produce a product and provide viable employment to many will, with the same breath, embrace professional athletes and celebrities who are, in most cases, much wealthier than company CEOs but produce no product and contribute little to society other than entertainment. This phenomenon is a fascinating study waiting for someone to take the time to address it. Fifth, any movement in Critical Theory will trump tried and true established theories and truths in science, medicine or philosophy. It will be Critical Theory that pushes the agenda and the change in the field and not expertise or experience. We see this taking place in government, law and even medicine. And, finally, Critical Theory sees everything as embedded power structures existing in a binary world of oppressed and oppressors. Everyone is either looking to oppress or being oppressed. Everyone is either bias in some way or the victim of some sort of bias directed against them. Dominant norms that are good for society will be condemned, not on their merit or quality, but because they have existed in a dominant position for too long. Overall, we must remember that Critical Theory has as its foundation Marxism, and it will always have Marxist’s tendencies which identify it. Each of the examples I have presented have one thing in common: all of them are Marxist in nature. 

This is the world in which we live, and it is a Critical Theory world … for now! One thing I know, all things eventually come to an end. The Babylonians, The Roman Empire, the Greeks … all of them came to an end at some point and so too will Critical Theory. When that day comes, and the history for this movement is written what will it say?  

This concludes my series on Critical Theory. I could spend the next year on this one topic, but all things must come to an end; it is time to move on to something new. Thanks for reading and remember, thinking matters!     

Critical Theory: Part V

by C. P. Lawrence

Critical Theory: Part V

The Deconstruction and Development of a Theory That Is Critical  

I have now arrived at the point where I will pull back the layers of development regarding Critical Theory. Theory, before Critical Theory, had, as part of its composite, elements that were analytically oriented towards analysis with a distinct dialectic tendency. With this dialectic tendency, theory was considered a well-substantiated explanation of an aspect of the natural world. It required fluidity with an analytical orientation which allowed theorists, especially those in science, to make predictions based upon it being testable under controlled conditions in experiments. In the case of philosophy, theories were evaluated through principles in abductive reasoning and pushed to withstand scrutiny; they were used to test a thesis though the development of an anti-thesis, which was thought to confirm whether the original thesis was true or false. This element of theory was, for Horkheimer, problematic as the dialectic was not only rooted in science but also a benefactor of positivist protection. It was perceived as a process that revealed true scientific tendencies through objective means (positivism). Horkheimer recognized that theory, left untouched, did not have roots or tendencies towards Marxism nor would it ever have any of those tendencies unless its foundational structure changed. 

Horkheimer began the deconstruction of general theory by making a connection between theory and society, which pulled a distinctly social element into the perception of theory. He established this connection through what he called the savant or the specialist. This was an important step in the deconstruction of theory; he wrote regarding the specialist, “Particular traits in the theoretical activity of the specialist are here elevated to the rank of universal categories of instances of the world-mind, the eternal Logos.” His point was to establish that it was the individual (a member of society) that was the universal when it came to the theoretical (theory) because, according to Horkheimer, the universal was not theoretical or dialectic; it was, instead, individual genius. It was this push towards individual genius that also established theory as historical. He explained that the decisive elements of theory were nothing more than those activities of society, which are “reduced” to the theoretical through the activities of individuals in society, and in the case of theory, the activities of a specialist or of individual genius were activities of society. This tied theory to the social through the individual (either as a specialist or through individual genius), and it was the individual that rooted theory in the historical through the time and space occupied by the individual.  

In his union of theory and the individual, Horkheimer created a bridge from the theoretical to the social via the individual through individual genius, but it was the specialist whose activity he labeled as “the power of creative origination.” This activity, to a Marxist, was production, which Horkheimer labeled “creative sovereignty of thought,” which reinforced that even the individual’s thoughts were social and historical. This effectively removed scientific theory from its privileged and protected positivist (objective truth) position and reduced it to a social action. This was a line in the sand for Horkheimer … a risk he was willing to take. The risk—attacking the legitimacy of all other theories grounded in the scientific through his new “critical theory—was well worth it for him. Coming out of World War II and the oppressive reign of the Nazi war machine, he believed people were open to this radical change he proposed, especially if it “appeared” to bring back the civil liberties and the freedoms they had lost. 

For Critical Theory to live beyond its inception, it would need the idea of theory (the theoretical) to be re-cast as a different perception with a different semantical interpretation, one that embraced Critical Theory without requiring Critical Theory to embrace old ideas of theory, change to them or be compromised by them as applied by science. This new theory Horkheimer proposed had to exist as dominant while bringing change to the theories it encountered in ways that pushed them towards tendencies that were critical and Marxist, and the only way to do this was for it (Critical Theory) to be authoritative. When encountering all other theories it had to be “the” critical theory in each interaction. From my perspective, I do not believe this could have happened at any other point in history; after World War II and the Nazi regime’s widespread oppression, Horkheimer saw an opportunity and took it.  

Horkheimer, to usher in this change, pushed the theoretical to the point of instability, which produced doubt, setting it up to be re-established as “the” critical theory to remove the doubt that was now there. Theory, for Horkheimer, was now where it needed to be; it was no longer theoretical in any protected sense but instead, it was a true means of production. Its perception was now more a social function or an individual decision than anything theoretical, which made it part of production, which he labeled as a “production of unity,” which reduced production to that of a product. Horkheimer never saw production as something that produces a product; he saw production only as a product of culture, manifesting in the same ways as other cultural products. For him, it had to be a means of production that could be controlled by Marxism. If production was no longer a process of “becoming,” then it would be open to “becoming” something new, something with Marxist tendencies, especially if it was firmly entrenched in the social and the historic. As a product that was social and historic, it would now be oriented towards individual tendencies (the savant or the specialist), opening it up to cultural changes and semantical shifts with distinctly Marxist orientations. 

As a product, the process of production was now categorical, easily manipulated and positioned to be re-formed in a different light. Horkheimer’s attack comes full circle, when he wrote, “In reality, the scientific calling is only one, non-independent element in the work of historical activity of man, but in such a philosophy the former replaces the latter.” Linking theory to history allowed it to be supple in much the same way history was, which positioned theory to be pliable … more open to revisions, changes and the influence of propaganda, which would allow it to be impacted by the orientations of scholars and theorists addressing it in much the same way history was addressed. This pliability that was now attached to scientific theory was no longer fluid in any natural sense but mechanical in every aspect of its movement. Its movements were intentional, which allowed it to be manipulated through the power functions of those overseeing it. It would become dependent on individuals and their interpretations, orientations and contexts and it would no longer be dialectic. This created space for Critical Theory to move into and take over the theoretical through the individual.  

As I read Horkheimer’s essay, his attack on the theoretical was on full display; he saw all dominant theories and philosophies, as well as those objects we perceive as natural—cities, towns, fields, and woods—as bearing the marks of man and shaped by man’s oppression. They were products of society to him, the means of production and in a perfect Marxist world, equally distributed to all and not left to the bourgeois to manage and control. He was clearly now viewing theory, through a distinctly Marxist lens, as social and historical. Theory was part of society and tainted in all the same ways; Horkheimer wrote regarding society, “The existence of society has either been founded directly on oppression or been the blind outcome of conflicting forces, but in any event not the result of conscious spontaneity on the part of free individuals.” This one statement about society was also to be applied to theory, prior to his deconstruction of it. He saw society as that which was built intentionally with ill intentions. He wrote regarding this thought, “As man reflectively records reality, he separates and rejoins pieces of it, and concentrates on some particulars while failing to notice others.” Those concepts of recording, separating and rejoining are conscious intentional actions impacted by the beliefs and values of those individuals determining the recorded, separated and rejoined. Horkheimer bemoaned the intentionality of society and saw its structure as intentionally created to give the bourgeois everything at the expense of everyone else, and yet he used it to deconstruct theory and recreate it as Critical Theory.  

What Horkheimer initiated so many years ago has come to fruition. Horkheimer has essentially replaced theory with a “critical” theory that is analytically and distinctly Marxist. He took the theoretical, and its dialectic orientation and replaced its praxis with a Marxist one. The authoritative nature of theory, which has been assumed, especially in science, to possess an objective ability to confirm what is true, has now been taken over by a Marxist orientation with intentions oriented towards Marxist truisms. It is Marxist tendencies that are now dominant inside theory. They have been reconfigured to analyze other non-Marxist theories in critical ways … to cast doubt on them until they are overrun by this new configured “critical” theory. In the end, they either submit to it or die. This is Critical Theory; it was created to be “the” critical theory of all theories and to leave Marxism in a dominant position in science and ultimately in society. This is where we find our world today … right where Horkheimer and his colleagues had hoped it would be. It is Critical Theory that drives the ideas in our colleges, pushes the bills in our government and changes the norms in our culture and every idea, bill and norm has tendencies that are critical and distinctly Marxist. As we look at our culture and ask, how did we get here? There is but one answer … Critical Theory! Stay tuned for the next installment of this series. Until then, remember, thinking does matter!   

Critical Theory: Part IV

by C. P. Lawrence

Critical Theory: Part IV

The Creation of “Critical” Theory

In my last post, I suggested that Horkheimer, to create his new “theory” had to re-create the general idea of theory itself. I posited my own assertions, which, if I am honest, are based strictly on my reading of his essay and my own convictions formed from that reading, which is my attempt to stay inside the spirit of Critical Theory. I tried to limit my secondary sources and keep his essay front and center with little to no outside interference. Right or wrong, I am left with my own assertions; whether they are corroborated by others or even valid seems to me of little consequence considering what I have read so far in his essay. 

In a world of Critical Theory, one of the first impressions that came to me was this one: there are no rules. I need only to assert my ideas in persuasive sincere ways and that should be enough, but that is problem. It should never be enough; It should require more because, like it or not, they are my perceptions and those will always be based on me. It is the same with Marxists, Idealists and Pragmatists; beliefs and values always turn into perceptions. The important point is not to assert your perceptions as true but to determine whether your perceptions are true. Let’s jump right into this post with my own assertion.

My initial assertion regarding Horkheimer’s work on theory begins with this thought: to make it “critical” would require it be fully “critical” from all angels and for all situations. The only way I see this being accomplished is if Critical Theory becomes the dominant theory over all other theories. Regardless of the validity of my claim, to answer that question I must examine, in detail, his attack on theory, or the theoretical (I reference it at times this way to clarify it from the categorical or the practical), because whether right or wrong, it reads as an attack to me. My perception is impacted by his statements; for example, he wrote, “The traditional idea of theory is based on scientific activity as carried on within the division of labor at a particular stage in the latter’s development.” Here Horkheimer seemed to direct his attack against theory by linking traditional theory directly to the action of the individual engaged in the theory, and in doing so, he presented the idea that the scientific action of a theory was no different than any “other activities of a society.” What I believe he was positing was that the individual action of employing a theory was, in substance and essence, no different than the individual action of a teacher, a coach or any other person acting according to their own convictions as a member of society; they are all social actions, which, in a subtle way, places science in a position to be overrun by Marxism. 

I do not believe his point here was to destroy theory but, to keep it in a state of flux to be used for his purposes. I believe he meant to link current theory to the individual for the purposes of giving the individual power over the theoretical process, which ultimately was a connection to the means of production via the individual. Inside Marxism, the individual and their actions would always be considered a means of production. Regarding this, he wrote, “… the real social function of science is not made manifest; it speaks not of what theory means in human life, but only what it means in the isolated sphere in which for historical reasons it comes into existence.” In this one statement, he reinforced his reduction of science to that of a social function and presented it with Marxist tendencies: as a means of production. With no pressure to defend his assertion, he proceeded to “deconstruct” out the “positivist protection” that science enjoyed, which would always present it as true and never as a means of production.   

The result of this deconstruction was a reduction of the theoretical to a position where it would meet all the requirements to be a means of production, but he also does something else that was equally important. He plants into the discussion a subtle historical reference (“historical reasons”). This historical reference completes this reduction of science, from that of a theoretical process with positivist protection (my phrase) to one that was now an action resulting from an individual choice in time and space. This is important because, as a historical reference, the reduction of science was complete, He had moved it out of the theoretical realm and placed it firmly into the social realm, where it will be at the mercy of Marxism as a means of production.

Horkheimer next took aim at society, which he viewed from a distinctly Marxist perspective. He defined society, as “the result of all the work” of all sectors of production in culture. His negative view of capitalism stemmed from his belief that it was the bourgeois in a capitalist state who would be the ones benefitting from the labor of everyone in society, which, for him, was categorically unfair and oppressive. This categorical oppressiveness, for Horkheimer, even extended to all ideas and thoughts of a society. For Horkheimer the necessity of re-establishing the conception of theory in a Marxist tradition was priority one in his development of a new “critical” theory fully capable of competing against those theories already established and dominant. For it to have a chance it needed a cultural foundation that would welcome it and allow it to grow and to have that foundation, he would have to destroy the ideas of capitalism, which operated on ideas like supply and demand and Smith’s invisible hand, which would be almost impossible to control from a Marxist position. He would borrow the radical doubt of Descartes to accomplish this task.  

Horkheimer understood that every dominant theory, once doubted, would be less dominant and more vulnerable. For Critical Theory to take hold it had to be the critical lens used in analysis of all other theories and part of that critical analysis had to be doubt, which once used in analysis, by Critical Theory was left attached to the theory analyzed. Horkheimer’s goal was that one day Critical Theory would be the dominant worldview, but the current state of science, with its theoretical roots in qualitative and quantitative methodology, would destroy Critical Theory if it were not first destroyed. For Horkheimer, this was his motivation for his attack on the concept of theory. It was also why he used the radical doubt of Descartes in his critical analysis of theory to change it and then recreate it in the image of Critical Theory.

In his essay, Horkheimer dictated how theory was to be recreated semantically and culturally to reflect Marxist beliefs, and then he labeled this theory as “critical” and used it for critical analysis over all other theories. Horkheimer hoped to accomplish two tasks with his recreation of theory: he would eliminate the original idea of theory, which was a threat to Critical Theory, and recreated it in the image of Marxism. Second, he would use this recreated and reconstructed theory as vehicle to deliver Critical Theory in ways that would assert it as a worldview and as dominant. As we look out at our world, what do we see today? We see those dominant theories of the past willfully submitting to the whims and desires of Critical Theory. 

It is Critical Theory that has become the lens of critical analysis, leading the charge to canceling dominant theories of the past and open the cultural door for new theories to come rushing in and these theories connect with no other theories. They make no sense when it comes to science or even medicine and yet, the take hold, are defended and are profoundly impact culture. We need only to look back and ask a few questions. When it comes to Critical Theory, where is dialectic thought? What about the antithesis? We see those theories of the past cast into the darkness of doubt by the shadow of Critical Theory, and they either align with or, in some cases, are replaced by Critical Theory or they fade away and die.  

This is our world today. It is a world where Critical Theory has become more dominant than we even realize, and that is by design. My next post will explore how theory became “critical” theory, with the hope of educating all of us in ways that will help us identify Critical Theory and its impact. Until then …  

Critical Theory: Part III

by C. P. Lawrence

Critical Theory: Part III

The Crack in the Door 

When examining Critical Theory through the eyes of Max Horkheimer, we can see a bit of what makes it unique and different. Let me begin with a quote from Horkheimer; early in his essay, he wrote, “There is always on one hand, the conceptually formational knowledge and on the other hand, the facts to be subsumed under it. Such a subsumption or establishing a relation between the simple perception or verification of a fact and the conceptual structure of our knowing is called its theoretical explanation.” Here Horkheimer began to subtly push a shift in our knowing, pushing it into a realm that was almost that of ascendency where facts are now subsumed to our knowing, which is a distinctly Marxist tendency, but it was also very much an attack on current knowledge, albeit subtle. This is an important distinction to remember as we move forward. 

Horkheimer unpacked the idea of theory early in his essay, starting with a statement regarding the essence of theory; he wrote, “What scientists in various fields regard as the essence of the theory thus corresponds, in fact, to the immediate tasks they set for themselves.” This one statement, in my opinion, supported his earlier assertion regarding our knowing; that it is powerful, dominant and impactful on theory. He goes on to use words like “manipulation” and “supplied” to reinforce his concept of theory over one that so many have held as the standard and the determiner of our knowing. He was asserting that it was nothing more than an intentional task of an individual, inside their own individual essence, which was the application of his new assertion. Because he believed knowing was rooted in our own ascendency, he also believed it was nothing more than an individual choice, which established the concept of theory as he needed it to be presented … as personal, individual and rooted in historical and social condition. He wrote of “the manipulation of the physical nature” in the context of the “amassing of a body of knowledge” such as was supplied in an ordered set of hypotheses to imply, again, that there was individual intentionality to the idea of a theory. 

Horkheimer wrote of the influence of the subject matter on a theory and vice versa, calling the process “not only an intrascientific process but a social one as well.” It was important for him to defend his assertion of ascendency as his assertion was also an attack on the social dominant thinking of the day, which he identified earlier as theological in nature. The essay, at this point, reads as a scanning of the landscape, in some respects, of the theoretical in search of useful tools to develop and apply in ways that created and developed a distinctly Marxist ascendency at the expense of the current dominant theological one. We can identify the tools he found useful through the points of his deconstruction.

One such example was his references to the Positivists and to the Pragmatists. He brought attention to the fact that both had similar connections between the theoretical and the social, which he questioned as to whether either one was useful or even scientific. He pointed to the scientific task, and to the scientific community and to their own general call in such situations as a call that was a “sense of practical purpose” and a “belief in social value” when his assertion was that they were both nothing more than “a personal conviction”. This is a primary example of Horkheimer taking both concepts, deconstructing them to the point of doubt in their current states, with the purpose of reconstructing them later inside Critical Theory for beneficial purposes of enhancing and supporting Critical Theory. 

The dominant idea of theory, to Horkheimer, was always under his attack. He took the current idea of theory found in science and employed his deconstruction/reconstruction dichotomy to develop the future one he intended to employ. He began by acknowledging that scientists in various fields regard their own tasks as the essence of theory, and the key word here was “essence,” which he already established as that which was rooted in man. This idea of essence destabilized general scientific theory, pushing it away from the theoretical and towards the practical, pragmatic and even personal; it was the personal that destabilized theory to the point of existence. Once theory is personal it is no longer theoretical but instead opinion or perception, which positions it to be developed into something completely different. This was the brilliance of Horkheimer on display in Critical Theory.  

The conception of theory, for Horkheimer, was “grounded in the inner nature of knowledge” for the purpose of establishing it as historical, which, again, pushed it completely away from the theoretical, reducing it all the way down past the personal to an “ideological category.” Once it was categorical it become vulnerable to manipulation and in a state of readiness, for the purposes and intentions of the manipulator. Horkheimer wrote, “That new views in fact win out is due to concrete historical circumstances, even if the scientist himself may be determined to change his views only by immanent motives.” He goes on to note that concrete historical circumstances, while important, inside science tend to succumb to “genius and accident.” Here, again, is the brilliance of his deconstructive process on display as he casted doubt into the very essence of theory as it was currently known and employed. 

As Horkheimer explained why social conditions are not considered as much as other factors, he made an interesting reference. He wrote, “The theoreticians of knowledge usually rely here on a concept of theology which only in appearance is immanent to their science.” That one statement was followed by a reference to new definitions and how they are drawn, depending on directions and goals of research. This was the process of Critical Theory and the beginning of the end of general scientific theory. It would never again be as dominant despite the efforts of many. It took many years and consistent and continuous pounding away at the foundations by generations of Critical Theorists, but here we sit in the place that Horkheimer imagined many years ago. Critical Theory has become that which is imposing its will on all other theories.  

As we read Horkheimer, we are experiencing his deconstruction/reconstruction process, as it was used on the concept of theory inside science. It was this deconstruction of theory that was the crack in the door, so to speak, that opened for Critical Theory to come barging into culture. It is through Critical Theory that so many other different theories entered our culture and pushed their way into battling the norms of culture, but each would have never been granted access under the old concept of theory. The idea of the theoretical had to be destroyed for Critical Theory to take hold due to its subjective nature and its Marxist tendencies.

This concludes this post. Stay tune as I unpack more of Horkheimer’s essay with the hope that it will help us understand more about our world and the impact of Critical Theory on it. Until then … 

Critical Theory: Part II

by C. P. Lawrence

Making Sense of the Chaos

In the next several posts, we will look at Critical Theory through Max Horkheimer’s 1937 essay “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in which he first defines Critical Theory through the contrast of it with other traditional theories. It was Horkheimer who presented the agenda for the Frankfurt School in his 1931 lecture given upon receiving the directorship of the Institute of Social Research. In that lecture, Horkheimer proposed merging philosophy and social theory with psychology, political economy and cultural analysis in ways that developed a social philosophy capable of truly interpreting social reality, which, was and still is an important concept of Marxism, but there was more. He also implied that this process of interpretation of social reality would also create opportunities to change social reality. Why was that important? 

Social reality through a Marxist lens is always perceived to be bias (unless it is Marxist) and rooted in a class struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie (or capitalists). Marx saw capitalism like he saw all societies of the past, rooted in slave labor. To him, they were the same; their class struggles were similar with one smaller group exploiting everyone else for their own benefit, which is why he advocated, as a true Marxist, for the common ownership of the means of production. He believed common ownership would eliminate the profit motive, which he saw as one of the main causes of class struggle. He advocated replacing it with a motive for human flourishing, but time has not been kind to Marxism. Common ownership of the means of production has been used, not to produce human flourishing, but, instead, to oppress and crush human flourishing through the vehicle of communism. It is in communism where we find much of the tyranny and the oppression in our world today, and it is also in communism where we find more suffering than flourishing. Critical Theory is not Marxism, at least it is not supposed to be. How is it different? 

Horkheimer used social sciences as the standard for Critical Theory because he found that the social sciences modeled themselves after the natural sciences, which root themselves in empirical social research. This was important for him, but there was also the issue of a distinctly positivist orientation, which he had to address (Positivism is the idea that every assertion can be scientifically or mathematically verified which justifies the rejection of metaphysics and theism.). This positivist view of the world is still how we tend to see knowledge production today; it is true if proven by quantitative research (that which roots itself in the mathematical and the scientific), which make most of us positivist-bias, trusting only science and math as the means to truth. Truth is found by both objective and subjective means. Critical Theory not only does not embrace positivist theory, but it is slowly trying to replace it with itself, which was Horkheimer’s solution to this issues.  

When we examine Critical Theory, we find that it reflects only on its own origins, which are subjective and murky at best. This is one reason why Critical Theory moves away from a positivist view of the world … Critical Theory is primarily subjective; it depends on intentionality and seeks to leave space for newly created theories and philosophies with a distinctly Critical Theory orientation. It also embraces “an interdisciplinary methodology,” as I have highlighted, that seeks to bridge the gap between research that is empirical and research that is rooted in what one author called, “the philosophical thinking needed in the correlation of history and empiricism.” That bridge between, that which is static, in the past, (history) and, that which is experienced, in the present (empirical) is one that must be traveled. For a Marxist, it is an easy journey across, but for all others, it is one full of potholes and difficulties, which is seen as opportunity by the Marxist. One theorist put it this way, “Critical theory aims not merely to describe social reality, but to generate insights into the forces of domination operating within society in a way that can inform practical action and stimulate change.” Again, we cannot forget the Marxist view of social reality and the struggle they see in it. Critical Theory seeks to determine the best ways to undermine current social reality—because they see it as oppression—to prepare it for its own Marxist reality. 

One of the first and most fundamental goals of Critical Theory is to unite theory and practice, not to discover that which is true, but to form a “dynamic unity with the oppressed class.” This unity of theory and practice in Critical Theory is not a unity as much as it is takeover. Both theory and practice must submit to the subjectivity of Critical Theory in ways that transform, allowing for the formation of a dynamic unity with the oppressed class. When this transformation takes place, research, whether quantitative or qualitative, takes a hit and becomes something it was not supposed to be … tainted with intentionality and the subjectivity of Critical Theory. For Critical Theory to be itself, it required an intentionality, rooted in its subjectivity, forcing both theory and practice to surrender to the subjectivity of Critical Theory. It is the subjectivity of Critical Theory that is king in all its encounters, and this is by design.  

Horkheimer, in the opening paragraph of his essay stated, “The real validity of the theory depends on the derived propositions being consonant with the actual facts. If experience and theory contradict each other, one of the two must be reexamined.” This reexamination was the change Critical Theory brought to theory, but it could only happen if theory had already surrendered its past. In the past, if experience and theory contradicted each other the hypothesis was incorrect. For example, if my theory is that the sun will not come up tomorrow and I wake up and run to the window and see the sun then my hypothesis is not correct, forcing me to change my hypothesis. In Critical Theory, it is the hypothesis that has taken the place of practice and theory. It is no longer the hypothesis that determines the truth of a theory; Critical Theory is the truth and all other factors, including a hypothesis, are to be its subjects.

If experience and theory contradict each other something is wrong, but what? A theory that needs adjustment to align with experience is not really a theory but merely an assembly line of options that can be adjusted to produce the desired product. The idea of experience and theory in Critical Theory is not theoretical in any sense of the word; it is instead pragmatic, practical and interchangeable. Adjustments are sought to determine how to align experience with theory to create a social philosophy capable of changing theory first, but ultimately changing society. Horkheimer’s response to the contradiction of theory and experience was that either the scientist failed to observe correctly, or the principles of the theory were wrong, but we have to ask this question: are we talking about allowing the research to speak or using the research to speak for us? 

Horkheimer quotes Husserl’s definition of a theory: “an enclosed system of propositions for science as a whole.” The basic requirement of any theoretical system ultimately is harmony, but that harmony comes at the expense of the friction before it, and yet, there are indications that Critical Theory sought to keep and maybe even use the friction of other systems to destabilize them so that Critical Theory could be the harmony that these systems sought. Horkheimer references that the basic requirement of a theoretical system is “that all parts should intermesh thoroughly and without friction,” but then, he seems to lament that this traditional conception expresses a tendency towards “a purely mathematical system of symbols.” He goes on to reference that in large areas of natural science theory the formation has become a matter of mathematical construction. Horkheimer is implying that traditional theory is stuck in the rut of describing social institutions and situations as they are. Their analyses do not incorporate the Marxist view of social reality rooted in class struggle and oppression and therefore they have little to no effect on repression and class struggle. Horkheimer sought to build Critical Theory as the opposite of traditional theories, as that with a direct effect on social reality to answer the repression and struggle he saw in society.

As I close this post, let me encourage you to come back for Part III as I attempt to add more clarity to the confusing world of Critical Theory. Until then … 

Critical Theory: Part I

by C. P. Lawrence

Clarity for the Obscure

This post begins a series on Critical Theory as I attempt to bring a little clarity to that which is obscure, or at least seems obscure. It is always difficult to bring clarity to something that seeks to remain obscure (please note this reference). Is this the nature of Critical Theory or does it just appear this way to those of us unfamiliar with it? The conjectural nature of Critical Theory does position it to be distorted but is that distortion just part of its fabric or is it intentional? Good questions that demand answers, which is the purpose of this series. It will be a bit like nailing Jello to the wall … you will soon see what I mean. 

Let’s begin with the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which describes Critical Theory as a phrase that “does not refer to one theory but, instead, to a family of theories” which are designed to critique society through the assimilation of chosen normative perceptions through the empirical analysis of current societal norms. I know what you are thinking … what does all of that mean? Hidden behind this loquacious description is an agenda that is intent on many things but do not miss that changing the world is one of those intents. 

Let’s begin by dissecting this murky explanation of Critical Theory provided to us. What it says to us is that Critical Theory was intentionally created to be integrated in manners that disrupt the dominant norms of society through an intentionally-created analysis to deconstruct dominant norms into fragments that can then generate a praxis of sorts which can be applied to current culture, produce norms with Marxist tendencies. Whew! I am not sure that I provide much clarity, but in short, the idea is to provide Marxism an opportunity to become a worldview that can be applied in all situations throughs ways in which it can become the dominant worldview. Again, the goal is to gain a dominant foothold in mainstream society. All references to Critical Theory (and it is always capitalized as a proper noun) are references to the work of several generations of philosophers and theorists, all with foundations in the Marxist tradition. It is truly not just one theory but many theories working together for one common goal. Clear as mud, right. Let me provide a little historical context with the hope that it adds some lucidity.  

The whole idea started with the son of Herman Weil. Herman Weil was an exporter of grain. He made a fortune exporting grain from Argentina to Europe. Felix Weil inherited his father’s fortune, but instead of using it to broaden the family business, he used it to found an institute devoted to the study of German society through a distinctly Marxist approach. Not long after the initial inception, the Institute of Social Research, as it was to be known, was formed and formally recognized by the Ministry of Education as part of the Goethe University Frankfurt. The first appointed director was Carl Grunberg (1923-29), a Marxist professor from the University of Vienna. The institute was known for its work which combined philosophy and social science, two distinct and separate fields of study at the time, in ways that were informed by Marxism. As for the term, Max Horkheimer first defined it in his essay, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in 1937. I will be referencing and quoting from this essay in this series. 

Today, Critical Theory, is composed of many different strands of emerging forms of engagement in all areas of culture, all coming together to destabilize current dominant norms into positions of weakness. In these positions of weakness, the intent is to introduce forms of Critical Theory that eventually erode the dominant ideas and replace them with ideas rooted in and composed of Marxism. The entire process was an attempt to normalize Marxism and package it in a way that allowed it to be transformed into the norms of society. This became known as the “Frankfurt School” of critical theory, and as we will find out, they were very successful. 

This school is not really a “school” in any sense of the word but a loosely held (critical) tradition or belief system that is bonded by critiques on how to best define and develop the (critical) tradition in ways that will push it into mainstream society. Marxism’s largest deficit was thought to be its absence in mainstream society; it was thought that if it could just be applied and lived out by more people it would be embraced and change culture. The movement was meant to correct this perceived deficit through a more expansive means that would extend its roots deep into culture and provide more people the means to embrace it. The initial efforts of the (critical) tradition attempted to combine philosophy and social science into an applicable theory that would serve as a door into mainstream culture; it was created with “liberating intent” (with a goal of freeing society from the current dominant norms), but here is an important part of the application of this theory. These philosophers were patient; they understood that what they wanted to accomplish would take time. It would actually take generations of philosophers pursuing the same theories in the same manners to claim any ground in mainstream society. The first generation of these philosophers were, what has been called, “methodologically innovative” in their approach to developing this (critical) tradition. Marxism was their vehicle of change; it was also their product, which they hoped would become dominant part of society. They integrated it with the work of Sigmund Freud, Max Weber and Fredrich Nietzsche, each had made their own inroads in society, using their work in secondary ways to develop a model of critique anchored in, what is known today as, Critical Theory.

Some of the prominent first-generation philosophers were Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin and Jurgen Habermas, who is still a important figure of second-generation philosophers in Critical Theory. In what is sometimes known as the third sense of Critical Theory, the work of Michel Foucault and Jacque Derrida was referenced and used to advance the tradition due to their associations with psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, with particular interest in Derrida’s theories of deconstruction. Once a workable tradition (theory) was created, it was used as a means of analysis of a wide range of phenomena—from authoritarianism to capitalism to democracy. Each analysis drew Critical Theory closer to the pillars of society ­—the family, the church and the school—and to the replacement of a moral paideia with one with Marxism foundations. Today, we see evidence of its presence in a wide range of cultural norms, including in how we live, think and act. Its influence is wide and deep and extends into many areas of current culture in such a complete way that there are elements of Critical Theory in our lives that we don’t even consider Critical Theory. 

As I close this post, my goal was to give you a macro-picture of Critical Theory. I hope you are now a little closer to understanding it than you were before you read this. In my ensuing posts, I will begin to unpack the tradition so that we not only understand it, but we can also identify it and the areas of our own lives it is impacting. This is why thinking matters to all of us.